Freedom of Conscience, but Which One? In Search of Coherence in the U.S. Supreme Court\u27s Religion Jurisprudence by Weil, Patrick
	
313 
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, BUT WHICH ONE? 
IN SEARCH OF COHERENCE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S  
RELIGION JURISPRUDENCE 
Patrick Weil* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 314 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL STORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAUSES 
ON RELIGION ............................................................................. 318 
A.  The Establishment Clause and the Search for a Standard ...................... 319 
1.  The Lemon Test and its Limits ................................................ 321 
2.  Developing New Standards: Non-Endorsement and Non-Coercion ... 323 
3.  The Disputed Dominance of the Non-Coercion Test ...................... 326 
B.  The Free Exercise Clause and the Uncertain Status of Exemption .......... 328 
II.  BRENNAN’S DIFFERENTIATION OF AUDIENCES,  SPACES, AND  
LEVELS OF COERCION ............................................................... 332 
A.  The Schempp Concurrence: A Product of a Social Mobilizations and 
Counter Mobilizations............................................................... 333 
B.  Brennan’s Frame is Tested: Children Remain Protected ........................ 337 
III.  CONSCIENCE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT ................... 342 
A.  From Barnette to Smith: Counter-Mobilizations in the Name of 
Conscience ..................................................................................... 343 
B.  Stevens’s Freedom of Conscience and the Court’s Religion  
Jurisprudence .......................................................................... 347 
	
 * Martin R. Flug Visiting Professor of Law and Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School.  Senior 
Research Fellow, French National Research Center, University of Paris1, Pantheon-Seabonne.  
I began work on this article three years ago.  Matt Butler—my research assistant at Yale Law 
School—provided an invaluable contribution to this project from the beginning, through his genuine 
commitment to and ongoing support of the work as well as his comprehensive and impressive 
knowledge of the jurisprudence on religion.  At the end of the process, Philip Petrov offered percep-
tive and decisive help in the clarification and theorization of the main arguments developed in the 
article.  Rosalie Abella, Bruce Ackerman, Christian Burset, Steven Calabresi, Michael Clemente, 
Jean Cohen, Owen Fiss, Heather Gerken, Marci Hamilton, Dan Kahan, Douglas NeJaime, Robert 
Nelson, Habib Olapade, Eugene Rusyn, Reva Siegel, David Super, James Whitman, and John Witt 
have contributed highly to the improvement of the article and to its final version through their com-
ments, suggestions, and—on occasion—their challenges.  To all I am very grateful. 
314 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:2 
C.  Individual Freedom of Conscience Subsumes the Law and Constitution ... 350 
IV.  INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE UNIFIES THE RELIGION 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT ............................................... 355 
A.  Freedom of Conscience Within Brennan’s Framework ........................... 355 
B.  Yoder, a Misinterpreted Parent of Hobby Lobby ............................ 363 
CONCLUSION: COULD FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE BE A  PRIVILEGE  
AND IMMUNITY OF U.S. CITIZENS? ............................................ 368 
INTRODUCTION 
One searching for an introduction to the state of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on religion could begin with Justice Clarence Thomas’s 2001 
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Utah Highway Patrol Association v. American 
Atheists, Inc.  Declaring the “Establishment Clause jurisprudence [to be] in 
shambles,”1 Justice Thomas catalogued its seeming contradictions: 
[A] creche displayed on government property violates the Establishment 
Clause, except when it does not.   
  Likewise, a menorah displayed on government property violates the Es-
tablishment Clause, except when it does not.   
  A display of the Ten Commandments on government property also vio-
lates the Establishment Clause, except when it does not.   
  Finally, a cross displayed on government property violates the Establish-
ment Clause, as the Tenth Circuit held here, except when it does not.2 
These “wildly divergent outcomes” and the seeming lack of “a workable prin-
ciple” can be tied, in Justice Thomas’s account, to an “Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence that invites this type of erratic, selective analysis of the consti-
tutionality of religious imagery on government property.”3 
Some commentators attribute this inconsistency to changes on the bench.  
Reacting to Town of Greece v. Galloway,4 where a 5-4 Court held that a prayer 
	
 1  Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994,  (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 2 Id. at 1001–03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), quoted in Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, 
Not Following the ‘Leader,’ N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 2, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/11/02/leading-from-behind.  Lower court judges have also expressed dissatisfaction.  See, 
e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(“The case law that the Supreme Court has heaped on the defenseless text of the establishment 
clause is widely acknowledged, even by some Supreme Court Justices, to be formless, unanchored, 
subjective and provide no guidance.”); see also Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1023–24 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“The still stalking Lemon test and the other tests and factors, 
which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from time to time in order to answer specific 
questions, are so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not become 
more fathomable.”). 
 3 Am. Atheist, Inc., 565 U.S. at 1004, 1006. 
 4 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
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ceremony at the start of local municipal council meetings was constitutional, 
Linda Greenhouse described the Court as “systematically effac[ing]” the Es-
tablishment Clause.5  She noted a marked shift away from “the school prayer 
decisions of the 1960s, the 1992 decision barring clergy-led prayer at public 
high school graduations, and as recently as 2000, a 6-to-3 decision barring 
student-led prayer at high school football games.”6  Is this the case?  The 
state of confusion described by most commentators7 may originate much 
closer to the source.  The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”8  As much as the Establishment Clause has resulted in scattered 
rulings, so too has the Free Exercise Clause seen many lives. 
After another recent case, commentators again declared the Court’s rul-
ing inconsistent with precedent.  In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court 
struck down the Affordable Care Act’s contraception coverage mandate for 
“closely held corporations” that had religious objections to the mandate.9 
For instance, Hobby Lobby would have lost its case under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, pursuant to the Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith.10  Instead, the Court decided Hobby Lobby under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).  In so doing, the Court more than restored 
the pre-Smith jurisprudence on religious exemption—it went well beyond it.11  
But this move does not just reflect the conservative turn on the Court over 
	
 5  Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Reading Hobby Lobby in Context, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/linda-greenhouse-reading-hobby-lobby-in-con-
text.html?mcubz=0. 
 6  Id. 
 7 See, e.g., 2 DONALD P. KOMMERS & JOHN E. FINN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 (1998) 
(assessing Supreme Court jurisprudence on religion as “conceptually and doctrinally confused”); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 227 (2008) (observing that “[r]ecent Estab-
lishment Clause cases look like a mess.  The proliferation of standards and distinctions is perplexing 
even to scholars.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1264 (2d ed. 1988) 
(asserting that “it seems impossible to divine a coherent set of principles to explain the judicial 
evaluations”); Mary Ann Glendon, Religion & the Court: A New Beginning?, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1992, 
at 21, 22 (noting that the Court jurisprudence on religion “is described on all sides, and even by the 
judges themselves, as hopelessly confused, inconsistent, and incoherent.”). 
 8  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 9  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60, 2785 (2014). 
 10 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 890 (1990) (holding that a state could refuse to exempt 
Native Americans from a prohibition on drug use because the law did not purposefully disfavor 
their religious practices), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb (2012); see also Greenhouse, supra note 5 (noting that the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby would 
not have received an exemption for religious claims under the holding of Smith because the Afford-
able Care Act was not “passed to single out religion for particular disfavor.”). 
 11 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (“[A]s RFRA’s statements of purpose and legislative history make 
clear, Congress intended to restore, not scrap or alter, the balancing test as this Court had applied it 
pre-Smith.”), quoted in Greenhouse, supra note 5 (describing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s view that 
the RFRA’s extension of free-exercise rights to for-profit corporations was unprecedented).  
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the last few decades, a shift that a change of Justices could reverse.  After all, 
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in Smith, and RFRA 
was passed by a near-unanimous Congress in response. 
In fact, the perception of a confusing and contradictory jurisprudence re-
flects a more fundamental phenomenon: The Court’s clause-by-clause inter-
pretative approach to the First Amendment has failed to provide a coherent 
jurisprudence.  With that method, each case demands that the Court first dis-
tinguish between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause and then begin 
working through the doctrinal implication of the relevant clause.  The case law 
for each clause is assumed to be distinct and internally coherent.  This method 
has dominated—and continues to dominate—the way jurists and academics 
approach these two clauses and understand the Court’s interpretation of them. 
But a more unified and comprehensive approach lies beneath the surface.  
This approach was displayed in two rare opinions written by two Justices.  In 
order to understand the jurisprudence and to find coherence in it, these Jus-
tices considered not only both Religion Clauses, but also all cases pertaining 
to religion that involved other constitutional provisions.12 
This global alternative was first developed in Justice William Brennan’s 
concurrence in a school prayer case—School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp.13  Justice Brennan seized the opportunity presented by a concurrence 
to study extensively all of the Supreme Court’s decisions related to religion 
from a socio-historical perspective.  He found that the Court’s reasoning could 
not be traced to a unitary philosophical principle; instead, it hinged on a prin-
ciple of differentiation on the basis of the particular publics, spaces, and levels 
of compulsion that arose in each case.14  While Brennan’s approach may seem 
unsatisfactory, given both that it was expressed in a concurrence and that it 
seems to lack a clear underlying principle, it came to exercise a strong influ-
ence over the way in which the Court would deal with religion cases.15  The 
	
 12 For example, the First Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I, the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1.  
 13 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294–97 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that deter-
mining the permissible relationship between government and religion requires an inquiry into the 
“special circumstances” giving rise to each case). 
 14 Id. at 296–304; see also Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE 
L.J. 692, 702, 705, 707 (1968) (discussing the problems posed by the clause-by-clause approach of 
the Supreme Court with an emphasis on Brennan’s concurring opinion as an attempt to change 
the approach). 
 15 Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Schempp has become a central part of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
being cited by thirteen different Justices in twenty-seven opinions since 1963.  Justice Brennan cited 
it in nine cases.  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 & n.5 (1987) (Brennan, J., majority opin-
ion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 715, 717, 719 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812, 816–17, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
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second important step in the alternative approach came decades later, with 
Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.16  Stevens 
“identified the individual’s freedom of conscience as the central liberty that 
unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment.”17  Unlike Brennan, Ste-
vens did not elaborate on this principle; rather, it was a one-time flash of ge-
nius that extracted from a disconcerting jurisprudence an interpretation de-
veloped in a few paragraphs and then largely gone unnoticed by jurists. 
The Article demonstrates how Justice Stevens’s concept of individual free-
dom of conscience, combined with Justice Brennan’s framework, unifies and 
gives structure to the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence.  Implemented 
differently depending on the spaces involved, as well as the type of public and 
degree of coercion, the concept of “freedom of conscience” has structured—
implicitly or explicitly—the Court’s religion-related jurisprudence. 
This Article relies on research conducted in previously unexplored ar-
chives of various Justices who participated in deciding many religion-related 
cases since the Second World War.  But more than bringing unavailable ma-
terial to our attention, these archives permit us to refocus our attention on 
parts of opinions that have often been neglected or ignored. 
	
202, 221 (1982) (Brennan, J., majority opinion); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 n.17 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 770, 772 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 750 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Neb. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Sch. Dist. of Hartington, 409 U.S. 921, 926 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680–81 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Justices Souter and Marshall 
cited it in three cases each.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 872 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Bd. 
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1994) (Souter, J., majority 
opinion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 576 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 
830, 848 n.2 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 113 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (Marshall, 
J., majority opinion).  Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger cited it in two cases each.  Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 705 (1986) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (Burger, 
C.J., majority opinion); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1978) (Powell, J., majority opinion); 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39, 786 (1973) (Powell, 
J., majority opinion).  Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Blackmun, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Kennedy, 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist cited it in one case each.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 
1811, 1819 (2014) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J, dissenting); Cty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 618 (1989) (Blackmun, J., majority opinion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 99 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 16 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52–54 (1985) (describing the First Amendment clauses as collectively protect-
ing an individual’s right, or “freedom of conscience,” to select and observe any religion). 
 17 Id. at 50; cf. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (noting that the First Amendment clauses overlap because 
they both require neutrality, but not constructing neutrality as a common principle covering the 
two clauses beyond the Establishment Clause). 
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Part I of the Article describes how the Court’s jurisprudence has tradi-
tionally been guided by an approach that distinguishes between the two Re-
ligion Clauses.  Within this clause-bound doctrinal approach, Justices have 
competed to impose their own views for determining whether a law violated 
the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.  Part II of the Article 
shows how Justice Brennan’s interpretation of the Court’s religion jurispru-
dence—based on the differentiation of spaces, audiences, and degrees of co-
ercion—transcended the formal distinction between the two clauses.  Justice 
Brennan’s interpretation first gained legitimacy through popular mobiliza-
tions, and then through threshold or test cases.  Although the Justices offered 
different justifications for that jurisprudence, the Court ultimately settled 
Brennan’s frame, for example by strictly distinguishing children and adults.  
Part III of the Article addresses how the concept of “freedom of conscience” 
emerged, through religion cases located outside the scope of the clauses, be-
fore being used to justify cases within the clauses.  In Part IV, I show that 
freedom of conscience—as applied to different spaces, publics, and degrees 
of constraint—provides a framework to the Court’s jurisprudence.  For the 
Court, freedom of conscience involves the right of the individual not to suffer 
harm in the form of an external imposition of another’s conscience, even in 
those recent cases that have triggered the most controversy.  Given the 
Court’s understanding of freedom of conscience, Hobby Lobby can be seen for 
what it is: an heir of Wisconsin v. Yoder, wherein the Court found that Amish 
parents’ fundamental right to freedom of religion, which outweighed the 
state’s interest in educating children, was implicitly conditional on these ma-
ture children not being harmed and not refusing to leave their school.18  Since 
the Court, despite the polysemy of the concept, has applied one interpreta-
tion of freedom of conscience, not only as a strong guiding principle in all its 
decisions since 1943 but as an almost absolute right, I suggest in conclusion 
that the Court could posit this right—in both a negative and a positive 
sense—as a privilege and immunity of the American citizen. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL STORY OF THE  
FIRST AMENDMENT CLAUSES ON RELIGION 
For the past seventy-five years, the dominant approach taken by the Su-
preme Court toward the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses has been a clause-
by-clause interpretation separating the Free Exercise Clause and the Establish-
ment Clause.  Very few religion cases arose before World War II.  The sharp 
spike in such cases that occurred afterwards can be attributed to three main fac-
tors: first, the diversification of American society in the realm of religion, both 
	
 18 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); see also infra Part IV.B. 
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with the increase of diverse religious traditions and the more public presence of 
atheists and agnostics;19 second, the development of the modern state, first more 
regulatory,20 then more involved in welfare21 and in international wars; and 
third, and most importantly, the application of the First Amendment to the states 
through incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A.  The Establishment Clause and the Search for a Standard 
The Court had already incorporated the Free Exercise Clause in 1940,22 
when the incorporation of the Establishment Clause appeared in Justice Hugo 
L. Black’s decision in Everson v. Board of Education.23  Arch Everson, a taxpayer 
in Ewing Township, NJ, had brought a suit against the local board of educa-
tion for providing tax-funded subsidies for busing to public and private school-
children.24  Everson argued that funding students of private religious schools 
violated the Establishment Clause.25  The Court struggled to decide exactly 
where to draw the line between acceptable funding and unconstitutional pro-
motion of religion.  By a 5-4 margin, the Court ultimately came down in favor 
	
 19 When Gallup surveyed religious trends in 1948, 69% of those surveyed by Gallup identified as 
Protestant, 22% as Catholic, and 4% as Jewish, with only 2% identifying as “None” and less than 
.5% as “Other.”  Religion, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2017).  By 1980, those numbers were 61% Protestant, 28% Catholic, 2% Jewish, 2% Oth-
erwise, and 7% None, and by 2012, 41% Protestant, 10% Christian (nonspecific), 23% Catholic, 
2% Jewish, 4% Other, and 14% None, respectively.  Id.  Another survey of more than 35,000 
Americans by the Pew Research Center finds that the percentage of adults (ages 18 and older) who 
describe themselves as Christians has dropped from 78.4% in an equally massive Pew Research 
survey in 2007 to 70.6% in 2014.  America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. 3 (May 12, 
2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/. 
The percentage of Americans who are religiously unaffiliated—describing themselves as 
atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”—has jumped more than six points, from 16.1% to 
22.8%. Id.  And the share of Americans who identify with non-Christian faiths has risen 1.2 per-
centage points, from 4.7% in 2007 to 5.9% in 2014.  Id.  Racial and ethnic minorities now make 
up 41% of Catholics (up from 35% in 2007), 24% of evangelical Protestants (up from 19%), and 
14% of mainline Protestants (up from 9%).  Id. at 5. 
 20 See Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions¾Whether Religion Is Special or Not, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1395, 1396–97 (2014) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION (2013) and 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013)) (“[T]he growth 
of the modern regulatory state creates ever more opportunities for friction between legal and reli-
gious obligations.”). 
 21 See Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 388–96 
(1990) (describing how the rise of the welfare state aggravated the difficulty of interpreting the Es-
tablishment Clause). 
 22 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 305 (1940). 
 23 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947). 
 24  Id. at 3; see also Donald L. Drakeman, Everson v. Board of Education and the Quest for the Historical 
Establishment Clause 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 128 (2007) (explaining the background of Everson). 
 25  Id. at 8. 
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of the busing program’s constitutionality.26  Black likened school buses to “or-
dinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public 
highways and sidewalks.”27  While incorporating the First Amendment to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Black argued, in the name of the 
Court, that the State of New Jersey did not contribute money to the religious 
schools, nor did it otherwise support them.28  It was just helping parents “get 
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from 
accredited schools.”29  The distinction between what occurred within the 
school and outside the school seems to have played a pivotal role, which it 
would continue to play in the Court’s subsequent case law, especially Illinois 
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education30 and Zorach v. Clauson.31  Both McCollum 
and Zorach involved setting a dedicated time for religious instruction of public 
school students.32  In McCollum, the program involved the regular use of 
school facilities, classrooms, utilities like heat and light, and time from the reg-
ular school day.33  The Court considered “a utilization of the tax-established 
and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their 
faith” as falling under the ban of the First Amendment.34  All religious instruc-
tion under the Zorach program, by contrast, was conducted entirely off the 
school premises and was declared constitutional.35 
Although opponents to the separation between public schools and reli-
gion regained some hope after Zorach, that light quickly dimmed with the 
Court’s decisive opinions in Engel v. Vitale36 in 1962 and, the following year, 
Abington School District v. Schempp.37  Engel concerned New York state officials’ 
composition of an official school prayer, which students in public schools 
were encouraged to recite.38  Writing for a 6-1 majority, Justice Black found 
that such government-directed prayers violated the Establishment Clause, 
because they promoted religious belief through “indirect coercive pressure” 
and “writing or sanctioning official prayers.”39  Schempp concerned a family’s 
	
 26  Id. at 18. 
 27 Id. at 17–18. 
 28  Id. at 18. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 31 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 32  McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205; Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308. 
 33  McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205; id. at 234 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 34 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210. 
 35  Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308–11. 
 36 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 37 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 38  Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. 
 39 Engel, 370 U.S. at 431, 435–36.  Neither Justice Frankfurter nor Justice White took part in the 
decision, as Justice Frankfurter was incapacitated and Justice White was not yet participating.  Id. 
at 436; SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, ENGEL V. VITALE: PRAYER IN THE SCHOOLS 81 (2006). 
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suit against the Abington School District to enjoin it from requiring their 
children to participate in mandatory Bible readings as required under Penn-
sylvania law.40  Ruling 8-1, the Court found that the practice of school-spon-
sored mandatory prayer violated the Establishment Clause.41 
1.  The Lemon Test and its Limits 
Taken collectively, the line of cases from Everson to Engel and Schempp em-
phasizes a need to keep religion separated from a public institution.  Never-
theless, in 1971, the Court’s predominant interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause took a turn from refereeing separation to maintaining neutrality.   
Lemon v. Kurtzman42 addressed public subsidies of salaries of teachers and of 
secular educational materials in (primarily religious) private schools in Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island.  Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the 
Court, declared these subsidies unconstitutional.43  He laid down a three-
prong test for determining whether a statute “respecting” religion meets the 
Establishment Clause’s requirements: (1) it must have a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) its principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and on the basis of two recent cases,44 (3) it must not foster excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion.45 
The Lemon test dominated the Court’s jurisprudence for a decade.  In 
1980, for example, in Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court found that a Ken-
tucky statute requiring the posting on the wall of each public school class-
room in the state of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with pri-
vate contributions, had no secular legislative purpose, thus failing the first 
prong of the Lemon test.46  In reaching its decision, the Court applied the test 
to determine “whether a challenged state statute is permissible under the Es-
tablishment Clause.”47  However, that same year, the Court admitted that 
	
 40  Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205–06. 
 41  Id. at 223. 
 42 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 43  Id. at 604, 625. 
 44 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (finding that state grants of tax exemption to 
religious organizations do not violate the Establishment Clause); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (upholding legislation providing secular textbooks free of charge to students 
at religious schools). 
 45 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 46 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980). 
 47 Id. at 40; see Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785–86 (1973) 
(holding that a state statute which provided financial assistance to private schools violated the Es-
tablishment Clause because it induced parents to send children to sectarian institutions); see also 
Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 474, 482 (1973) (holding that a 
state law reimbursing parochial schools for testing and recordkeeping costs violated the Establish-
ment Clause because it failed to ensure that the funds were not being used for religious purposes). 
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the Lemon test “sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility.”48 
Moreover, in a 1983 case involving legislative prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, 
the Court broke from the strictures of the Lemon test.49  This case examined 
the constitutionality of the Nebraska legislature’s practice of opening sessions 
with a prayer, led by a state-funded chaplain.50  The Supreme Court held 
that government funding for chaplains was constitutional because of the 
“unique history” of the chaplaincies in American legislative bodies.51  Writ-
ing for the 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Burger highlighted that three days be-
fore the First Amendment was passed by the First Congress and sent to the 
states for ratification, on September 25, 1789, Congress authorized the hiring 
of legislative chaplains.52  The Chief Justice interpreted this as a clear indica-
tion that, at least for the amendment’s Framers, the Establishment Clause 
was not meant to cleave religion and public life entirely apart; rather, it was 
meant to prevent the more insidious intermixing of church establishments 
and the government.53 
Marsh was not the first time the Court cited history to justify a religious 
presence in the public sphere.  In 1961, an important set of cases had pro-
foundly divided the Court and the country.  The Court handed down cases 
that touched on both Religion Clauses and found that Sunday laws, or re-
strictions on what commercial activities could be done on Sunday, neither 
represented a law establishing religion nor constituted a violation of individ-
uals’ religious liberty.  Instead, the Court found that these originally religious 
laws had taken on a secular value.54  As Chief Justice Earl Warren explained, 
[D]espite the strongly religious origin of these laws, beginning before the 
eighteenth century, nonreligious arguments for Sunday closing began to be 
	
 48 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (“This is not to say 
that this case, any more than past cases, will furnish a litmus-paper test to distinguish permissible 
from impermissible aid to religiously oriented schools.  But Establishment Clause cases are not easy; 
they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on 
this subject of the people of this country.  What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid 
categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes.”). 
 49 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
 50  Id. at 784. 
 51  Id. at 791, 795. 
 52  Id. at 788. 
 53 Id. at 788, 792. 
 54 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600, 605 (1961) (finding that a Pennsylvania statute barring 
Sunday retail sales did not infringe upon religious rights, but “simply regulate[d] a secular activity” 
of store ownership); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 618, 627 
(1961) (holding that a Massachusetts statute forbidding Sunday business activity had a secular, not 
religious, purpose because it intended to “provide an atmosphere of recreation”); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 444–45 (1961) (describing Maryland’s Sunday Closing Laws as sec-
ular because they promoted a day of rest for all citizens); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. 
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 583–84, 595 (1961) (recognizing a Pennsylvania statute barring Sunday 
business operation as secular because it “was amended to permit healthful” Sunday exercises). 
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heard more distinctly and the statutes began to lose some of their totally 
religious flavor. . . . More recently, further secular justifications have been 
advanced for making Sunday a day of rest, a day when people may recover 
from the labors of the week just passed and may physically and mentally 
prepare for the week’s work to come.55 
In these cases, history was justifying a policy that—though originally reli-
gious—had become secular.  Twenty years later, history was used to justify 
the publicly funded expression of religion within a public institution, or a 
public body.  However, the implications of Marsh v. Chambers for broader ju-
risprudence remained contested and unclear for some time. 
Over time, a majority of the Justices on the Court found the Lemon test 
unsatisfactory.  As Professor Jesse Choper has argued, taken literally, the first 
prong of the test, “secular purpose,” would make unconstitutional all reli-
gious exemptions, from the military or from schooling.56  “Entanglement” 
also suffers from conceptual flaws.  For example, while the Court forbade 
states from financing parochial schools, it allowed them to set statewide edu-
cational standards for public and private schools alike.57 
2.  Developing New Standards: Non-Endorsement and Non-Coercion 
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, newcomers to 
the bench and moderately conservative appointees of President Reagan, 
each developed a new heuristic for applying the Establishment Clause to par-
ticular cases.  In 1984, Justice O’Connor introduced the non-endorsement 
test in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.58  Noting the lack of clarity 
around the Lemon test, she proposed “[f]ocusing on institutional 
entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion . . . as an 
analytical device.”59  She explained: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to 
a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political commu-
	
 55 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433–34. 
 56 Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 501 (2002). 
 57 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1977) (noting the parties’ stipulation that the Catholic 
schools at the heart of the litigation “teach the secular subjects required to meet the State’s mini-
mum standards”); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245–46 (1969) 
(“[A] substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at 
private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide 
minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects 
of instruction.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (asserting in dicta that states 
possess the constitutional power to regulate studies in all schools to make “certain [that] studies 
plainly essential to good citizenship [are] taught”); Choper, supra note 56, at 502 (noting one of the 
conceptual flaws of the “entanglement” prong is the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow states to 
regulate the curricula of parochial schools). 
 58 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 59 Id. at 689. 
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nity. . . . Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are out-
siders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message. . . . Focusing on the 
evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion makes clear that 
the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require inval-
idation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a 
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.60 
Justice O’Connor then cited three cases: Walz v. Tax Commission,61 where the 
Court held that tax exemptions for religious, educational, and charitable organ-
izations were constitutional; McGowan v. Maryland,62 where it sustained a manda-
tory Sunday closing law; and Zorach v. Clauson,63 where it accepted released time 
from school for off-campus religious instruction.  “What is crucial,” O’Connor 
concluded, “is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating 
a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”64 
The non-endorsement approach marked a shift from liberty to equality.  It 
sent a message against favoritism of one faith to children because nobody—
child or adult—should feel like an outsider in a good society.65  For the follow-
ing fifteen years, non-endorsement became an approach used by numerous 
Justices, indeed, a majority of them successively, but never simultaneously.66 
In between, in 1989, Justice Kennedy had developed his own heuristic 
for approaching  Establishment Clause cases: the non-coercion test.67  Joined 
in his partial concurrence and partial dissent to County of Allegheny v. ACLU by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White, Kennedy found that 
holiday displays on municipal property featuring both a crèche and an eight-
een-foot Hanukkah menorah did not violate the Establishment Clause inso-
far as neither could be seen as an attempt to coerce observers into adopting 
	
 60 Id. at 687–92. 
 61 Id. at 692 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). 
 62 Id. at 692 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)). 
 63 Id. at 692 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)). 
 64 Id. at 692. 
 65 See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 673, 695–98 (2002) (discussing the nature of the non-endorsement approach and its emphasis 
on protecting the political standing of religious minorities).  Feldman traces in Frankfurter’s con-
curring opinion in McCollum the focus of the feeling of religious-minority children and his focus on 
unity.  Id. at 697. 
 66 See Choper, supra note 56, at 505–08 (discussing various Supreme Court cases in which the Justices 
relied on the Endorsement Test to reach their holding). 
 67 In addition to Justices Berger, O’Connor, and Kennedy, Justice Souter has traced and constructed 
the coherence of the Establishment Clause in his dissent in Mitchell vs. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–83 
(2000), from neutrality (used in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946) and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 
392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968)) to evenhandedness (started in Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
756, 794 (1972)). 
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a particular set of religious views.68  In contrast, Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
and the majority of the Court found that the centrality of the crèche made 
displaying it unconstitutional.69 
In his approach, Kennedy consciously distances himself from the two 
prior predominant strands of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  In par-
ticular, he characterizes the Lemon test as an overly narrow reading of the 
Establishment Clause, as potentially  
giv[ing] the impression of a formalism that does not exist [and which t]aken 
to its logical extreme . . . would require a relentless extirpation of all contact 
between government and religion. . . . Rather than requiring government to 
avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment 
Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodat-
ing the central role religion plays in our society.70 
Kennedy also rejects Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test,” finding that 
it was inconsistent with the results in the Court’s previous decisions, espe-
cially Marsh, and the Court’s apparent acceptance of symbolic endorse-
ments—like “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency.71  He takes as central the 
proposition that, “whatever standard the Court applies to Establishment 
Clause claims, it must at least suggest results consistent with our precedents 
and the historical practices that, by tradition, have informed our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”72 
Returning to Zorach v. Clauson, where the Court “permitted New York 
City’s public school system to accommodate the religious preferences of its 
students by giving them the option of staying in school or leaving to attend 
religious classes for part of the day,”73 Kennedy stated that “rather than re-
quiring government to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, 
	
 68 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664, 679 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). 
69  Id. at 599–602 (majority opinion). 
 70 Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  Kennedy resists 
too facile a reading of the Lemon test, writing that he is “content for present purposes to remain 
within the Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test 
as our primary guide in this difficult area.”  Id. at 655. 
 71 Indeed, Kennedy explicitly notes the test’s genesis in Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence, writing: 
Although a scattering of our cases have used “endorsement” as another word for “prefer-
ence” or “imprimatur,” the endorsement test applied by the majority had its genesis in Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch.  The endorsement test has been criticized by 
some scholars in the field.  Only one opinion for the Court has purported to apply it in 
full, but the majority’s opinion in these cases suggests that this novel theory is fast becoming 
a permanent accretion to the law.  For the reasons expressed below, I submit that the 
endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.  The uncritical 
adoption of this standard is every bit as troubling as the bizarre result it produces in the 
cases before us. 
  Id. at 668–69 (citations omitted). 
 72 Id. at 669. 
 73 Id. at 658 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)). 
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the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing 
and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society.”74 
The border between accommodation and establishment requires diligent 
observation of two limiting principles:   
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion 
or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous 
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 
“establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”75   
However, since it was first invoked, numerous Justices have resisted the non-
coercion approach. 
3.  The Disputed Dominance of the Non-Coercion Test 
In his opinion for the Court in Allegheny, Justice Blackmun argued that, 
“Kennedy’s reading of Marsh would gut the core of the Establishment Clause” 
because “fail[ing] to recognize the bedrock Establishment Clause principle 
that, regardless of history, government may not demonstrate a preference for 
a particular faith, even he is forced to acknowledge that some instances of such 
favoritism are constitutionally intolerable.”76  O’Connor too resists Kennedy’s 
critique of the “endorsement test.”  She points out that Kennedy’s  
Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only ‘coercive’ practices or 
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the 
numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to partic-
ular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in [her] 
view, adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity 
of the members of our pluralistic political community.77 
In the following years, in order to marshal the support of a majority of 
colleagues, Justices writing for the Court in cases related to the Establishment 
Clause would continue to use different tests—Lemon, non-endorsement, and 
non-coercion—illustrating Justice O’Connor’s statement that, “[e]xperience 
proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot 
easily be reduced to a single test.  There are different categories of Establish-
ment Clause cases, which may call for different approaches.”78 
In 1993, if Justice Scalia could describe the Lemon test as “some ghoul in 
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, . . . frightening the little 
children,”79 it was because even if six of the Justices sitting on the Court had 
	
 74 Id. at 657. 
 75 Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
 76 Id. at 604–05 (majority opinion). 
 77 Id. at 627–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
 78 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994). 
 79 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993). 
	
Dec. 2017] FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, BUT WHICH ONE? 327 
criticized it, the Lemon test was still the basis for Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School District—the case in which Scalia made this comment.80  And 
it would still be proudly used and invoked in 2005 by Justice Souter when he 
delivered the Court’s opinion in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, a case 
concerning a display of the Ten Commandments.81 
Indeed, even in instances where Justice Kennedy’s approach prevailed, 
strong disagreements remained.  In Lee v. Weisman, Kennedy, writing for the 
Court, found that a prayer at a public middle school graduation ceremony 
violated the Establishment Clause.82  For Justice Kennedy, the children were 
effectively forced to participate in this prayer, since “to say a teenage student 
has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the 
extreme. . . . Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school 
graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions.”83  But Justice Scalia de-
rided this approach based on indirect coercion as “lay[ing] waste a tradition 
that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves” with “a 
boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion.”84 
More recently, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, where Kennedy delivered the 
opinion of the Court, he did not gather a majority for that part of the opinion 
where he again invoked the non-coercion concept.85  The four dissenting Jus-
tices rejected it.86  In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas based his support 
for prayer recitation in a municipal council on his originalist reading of the 
Establishment Clause which provides for its application to the federal govern-
ment, not to the states.87  In part two of his opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, 
Thomas argued “actual legal coercion” is unconstitutional, which does not in-
clude merely social or psychological coercion.88  In the end, Justice Kennedy’s 
non-coercion standard only garnered the approval of two other Justices.89  
	
 80  Id. 
 81  545 U.S. 844, 859–61 (2005) (referencing Lemon’s “three familiar considerations for evaluating Es-
tablishment Clause claims” and rejecting calls to abandon Lemon’s purpose test). 
 82  505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 83 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595.  Interestingly, when Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, he explicitly cited Lee as guiding his analysis, but incorporated 
much of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement reasoning in his analysis finding that student-led, student-
initiated prayer at a public high school football game was unconstitutional. 530 U.S. 290, 302 
(2000). 
 84 Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 85  134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815, 1824–25 (2014). 
 86  Id. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 87  Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 88  Id. at 1837–38. 
 89  Id. at 1824–25 (Kennedy J., plurality opinion) (writing for only Chief Justice Roberts, himself, and 
Justice Alito). 
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B.  The Free Exercise Clause and the Uncertain Status of Exemption 
Parallel to the unfolding of this Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Court wrote equally serpentine opinions regarding the Free Exercise Clause.  
The first of these Free Exercise cases came in Reynolds v. United States, the famous 
Mormon polygamy case, in which the Court upheld a ban on polygamy.90  In 
doing so, the Court distinguished between beliefs and conduct, finding the for-
mer protected under the Free Exercise Clause but the latter fully vulnerable to 
the legislative power of the government.  Writing for the Court, Justice Morri-
son Waite investigated the history of religious freedom in the United States and 
quoted a letter from Thomas Jefferson in which he wrote that there was a dis-
tinction between religious belief and the actions that flowed from religious be-
lief.  The former “lies solely between man and his God,” thus “the legislative 
powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions.”91 
Except in cases involving Mormon polygamy, the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century saw little else in terms of Free Exercise litigation.92  This 
began to shift in 1940 when, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court incorporated 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause against the states.93  Overturning 
the conviction of Newton Cantwell and his two sons—all Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses—for violating Connecticut’s solicitor licensing regulations and incit-
ing a breach of the peace, Justice Owen Roberts argued that  
to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or 
systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determi-
nation by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden 
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.94 
	
 90 98 U.S. 145, 166–68 (1878).  Reynolds was the first case in which the Court dealt with the Free 
Exercise Clause substantively. See Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds v. United States: The Historical 
Construction of Constitutional Reality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 687, 687 (2004).  The first case to reach 
the U.S. Supreme Court in which a party invoked the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
was Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. 589 (1845); the Court stated unanimously that the clause 
did not apply—at that time—to the acts of state and local governments. See Michael W. McConnell, 
Schism, Plague, and Last Rites in the French Quarter: The Strange Story Behind the Supreme Court’s First Free 
Exercise Case, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 40 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman, eds., 
2012). 
 91 98 U.S. at 164. 
 92 This was largely because, before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the subsequent 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states, few plaintiffs could base their cases on that First 
Amendment guarantee.  If violations implicating an individual’s Free Exercise rights arose, they 
often originated with a municipality or state authority, as the federal government passed few laws 
bearing on those rights.  In Davis v. Beason—the case that followed Reynolds—the Supreme Court 
reiterated its previous holding, stating that “[c]rime is not the less odious because sanctioned by 
what any particular sect may designate as religion.”  133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890).  This holding was 
further reiterated in The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States 
136 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1890). 
 93 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 94 Id. at 307. 
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This reasoning also helped to guide the Court’s decision in Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, which struck down a Pennsylvania ordinance requiring solicitors to 
register.95  Justice William O. Douglas characterized this provision as a reli-
gious tax imposed on Jehovah’s Witnesses to prevent them from preaching 
and worshiping God in the way they felt called to.96 
In 1962, with Sherbert v. Verner, the Court changed its reasoning.97  The 
case concerned Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist denied unemploy-
ment compensation after being fired for refusing to work on the Sabbath.98  
The Court found this denial of government benefits to be an unconstitutional 
infringement of her Free Exercise rights.99  Justice Brennan’s majority opin-
ion broke with the previous distinction made by the Court between beliefs 
and conduct.  For conduct not posing “some substantial threat to public 
safety, peace or order,” it raised the standard for overcoming infringements 
on individuals’ Free Exercise rights to heightened scrutiny.100  Brennan writes 
that “some compelling state interest . . . [must] justif[y] the substantial in-
fringement of [an] appellant’s First Amendment right” in order for that stat-
ute to stand.101  Although seemingly following in line with the allowances in 
Cantwell and Murdock, Brennan’s use of heightened scrutiny marked a major 
shift in the doctrine.  As Justice Harlan noted: 
The implications of the present decision are far more troublesome than its 
apparently narrow dimensions would indicate at first glance. . . . I cannot 
subscribe to the conclusion that the State is constitutionally compelled to carve 
out an exception to its general rule of eligibility in the present case.  Those 
situations in which the Constitution may require special treatment on ac-
count of religion are, in my view, few and far between, and this view is amply 
supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area.102 
Nine years later, Wisconsin v. Yoder presented a case where three Amish par-
ents declined to send their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, to public 
school after they completed the eighth grade.103  The parents were convicted 
of violating the compulsory education obligation imposed until the age of 
sixteen by a state law and fined $5 each.104 
In the Court opinion, the State’s interest in universal education had to be 
balanced against other fundamental rights, such as those protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of 
	
 95 319 U.S. 105, 108–10, 117 (1943).   
 96 Id. at 112. 
 97 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 98  Id. at 399–401 
 99  Id. at 410. 
 100 Id. at 403. 
 101 Id. at 406. 
 102 Id. at 422–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 103  406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 104  Id. at 208. 
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parents in directing their children’s religious upbringing.105  The Court found 
that at the request of their parents, Amish children should be exempted from 
mandatory public schooling after the eighth grade in order to permit the 
Amish faith to survive by transmission and practice.106  Chief Justice Berger, 
writing for the Court, noted that: 
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth 
grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a 
legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny 
the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state 
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause.107 
Twenty years later, the Court’s jurisprudence suggested that directing height-
ened scrutiny for every policy that infringed on someone’s religious convic-
tions might be too cumbersome.  This conclusion is most strongly stated in 
Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990 case on whether the state of Oregon had 
violated the Free Exercise Clause in denying unemployment benefits to a per-
son fired for violating the state prohibition on the use of peyote—even though 
the use of the drug was part of a Native American religious ritual.108  Deliver-
ing the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia found that the request for a state 
compelling interest test applied in matters of free speech would, when applied 
to religious exemptions, create an entirely unruly and unworkable system.109  
Scalia argued that to adopt a true “compelling interest” requirement for laws 
that affect religious practice would lead towards “anarchy.”110 
For Scalia: 
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally re-
quired religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceiva-
ble kind—ranging from compulsory military service to the payment of taxes 
to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, 
compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to social welfare 
legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, 
environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of oppor-
tunity for the races.111 
Instead, Scalia encouraged Smith and his backers to obtain the exemption 
through legislative processes at the state level.112 
	
 105  Id. at 213–14. 
 106 Id. at 219. 
 107 Id. at 214. 
 108  494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
 109  Id. at 888. 
110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 888–89 (citations omitted). 
 112  Id. at 890. 
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The reaction to Smith was swift and clear.  Seeing religious liberty as un-
der attack, Congress almost unanimously passed the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”)113 “to restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its appli-
cation in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”114 
The Court, however, did not back down. In 1997, it found RFRA un-
constitutional as applied to the states. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court de-
clared that Congress had only a remedial and not a substantive power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the states.115  Writing for 
the Court, Justice Kennedy found that Congress had exceeded its constitu-
tional powers by imposing the Sherbert compelling interest test, enshrined in 
RFRA, on the states, because it was not congruent and proportional response 
to the threat to religious liberty faced by U.S. citizens all over the country.116 
Congress again reacted, this time by passing, by unanimous consent in 
voice votes, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) in 2000.  This bill provided a more capacious definition of reli-
gious exercise as well as strong protections for an imprisoned person’s right 
to worship.  It also protected churches and religious institutions from having 
a “substantial burden” imposed upon them through land use regulations.117 
In Smith, the Court allowed legislatures to make religious exemptions to 
generally applicable laws and regulations.118  However, exemptions based on 
“assertedly sinful conduct of others” seem to have been expanded by the 
Court in Hobby Lobby to limits as yet unseen.119  
	
 113 All Information (Except Text) for H.R. 1308—Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308/all-info (last visited Aug. 23, 
2016). It was voted by voice vote in the House and 97 against 3 in the Senate. Id. 
 114 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (citations omitted) (citing Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); then citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).  RFRA 
provides as follows: 
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Although Hobby Lobby does not stand in formal contradiction with Smith—
wherein Scalia encouraged legislatures to set new rules if they wished—it 
contradicts the spirit of Scalia’s opinion in Smith, in which he warned against 
the risk of anarchy. 
In the latest Establishment Clause cases, non-coercion remains the guid-
ing principle.  However, it has failed to win over the whole Court, as Galloway 
illustrates.120  In addition to being in competition with other guiding princi-
ples, non-coercion does not attend to the details of every situation.  One 
could claim that coercion exists even when it is not particularly strong, such 
as in the Hamilton case where students were compelled to participate in a 
military exercise, or during legislative prayer.121 
Above all, the non-coercion test vindicates a negative right.  It is unable to 
justify the state’s active role in supporting religion in the military or in prisons, 
or in situations of voluntary or involuntary confinement, where the govern-
ment finances religious infrastructure and chaplaincies—seemingly in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause—all while forbidding chaplains to proselyt-
ize—seemingly in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  Is it possible to find 
coherence across all situations, a quality recognized by Justice Kennedy as 
defining an effective guiding principle, on the basis of a different standard? 
II.  BRENNAN’S DIFFERENTIATION OF AUDIENCES,  
SPACES, AND LEVELS OF COERCION 
Although the jurisprudence of both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause appears muddled, a unitary principle has been at work 
behind this apparent disorder.  In 1963, in his concurring opinion in Schempp, 
Justice Brennan provided a socio-historical approach to the Court’s jurispru-
dence on religion, covering not only the two Religion Clauses, but also other 
Constitutional protections that had been invoked by the courts. Covering a 
wide range of topics, Brennan’s entire opinion is structured around the idea 
that the Court’s jurisprudence on religion can be understood and interpreted 
in terms of differentiation of audiences, spaces, and degrees of constraint.  
Brennan devoted over three months to writing his concurrence, a 77-
page opinion buttressed with 410 footnotes.122  With his two clerks, Robert 
O’Neil and Richard Posner, he not only researched previous decisions, law 
reviews articles, books on the problem of church-state relations, and reports 
on the adoption of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the eighteenth 
	
 120  See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s failure to obtain majority approval of his non-
coercion analysis in Galloway). 
 121 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 250 (1934). 
 122  James Marlow, Brennan Writes Longhand, Then Scrubs What He Writes, RED BANK REG., July 3, 1963, 
at 8, http://209.212.22.88/data/rbr/1960-1969/1963/1963.07.03.pdf. 
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and nineteenth centuries, respectively, but also in the constitutions of India, 
Japan, and the German Republic of 1922.123  Brennan and his clerks also 
investigated the views of James Madison, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, 
Rogers Williams, Oliver Cromwell, and “a lot more.”124  Brennan wrote in 
longhand, crossed out what he wrote, and then wrote again, “constantly in 
search of the exact word.”125 
This effort was a response to a massive popular mobilization. One year 
earlier, Engel had generated a tremendous public outcry.  The Court’s deci-
sion was opposed by 85% of Americans and sparked an enormous popular 
movement to keep prayer, Bible readings, and other forms of religious prac-
tice in the nation’s public schools.126 
A.  The Schempp Concurrence: A Product of a Social Mobilizations and Counter 
Mobilizations 
After Engel, the Court received more mail than after the desegregation 
and Communist-subversion decisions, the largest in Court history up to that 
point.127  Representative Frank Becker (R-N.Y.), a major advocate of consti-
tutional amendments to protect religious expression in schools, introduced 
two bills in the 88th Congress.128  Becker’s later proposal read: 
Section 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit the 
offering, reading from, or listening to prayers or biblical scriptures, if partic-
ipation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, 
institution, or place. 
Sec. 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit making 
reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme 
Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, cere-
mony, school, institution, or place, or upon any coinage, currency, or obli-
gation of the United States. 
Sec. 3. Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion.129 
At the same time, a coalition of religious leaders and legal scholars joined 
together to oppose the so-called “Becker Amendment.”  Deans of law schools 
across the country as well as leaders of Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and 
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Evangelical denominations reached out to members of the House Judiciary 
Committee urging them not to pass such an amendment.130  The Committee 
organized a series of public hearings at which these prominent anti-amend-
ment voices took center stage and pointed to the many constitutional prob-
lems such an amendment would create.131  These delay tactics helped extend 
the discussions into June.  When the proposed amendment stalled, despite 
widespread public pressure to bring it to a vote, Becker filed a petition to 
have the resolution (now H.R.J. Res. 693) discharged from the Judiciary 
Committee and brought directly to the House floor.  Although it failed, 
Becker’s petition nevertheless garnered 167 of the necessary 218 signatures 
in the House, at which point Becker’s term ended and pro-amendment forces 
started to peter out.132  The Court did not yield to the uproar.  The Justices 
had been sensitive to the criticisms they received, but “this did not deter . . . 
them.”133  The differences in how children and adults came to be confronted 
with challenges on religion proved pivotal for the elaboration and eventual 
fate of Brennan’s analysis. 
Twenty years earlier, the Court had responded to a similar public uproar 
by overturning recent precedent.134  In 1940, a time of great patriotic fervor, 
the Court had taken up a case involving children and religion.  This case 
considered whether a public school could force young Jehovah’s Witnesses 
to salute the American flag and say the Pledge of Allegiance.  In Gobitis, the 
Court held that public schools could compel their students to salute the Flag 
and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, despite some religious children, such as 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, protesting against these requirements as running 
counter to their religious beliefs.135  With only Justice Harlan F. Stone in 
dissent, the Court found these religious liberty and free expression claims 
lacking.  Felix Frankfurter, writing for the Court, emphasized: 
National unity is the basis of national security.  To deny the legislature the 
right to select appropriate means for its attainment presents a totally different 
order of problem from that of the propriety of subordinating the possible 
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brary.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal64-1304697 (“In a statement submitted 
June 8 to the House Judiciary Committee, 223 of the nation's leading constitutional lawyers, in-
cluding the deans of 55 law schools, expressed opposition to any attempt to overturn the Court's 
decisions.”). 
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ugliness of littered streets to the free expression of opinion through distribu-
tion of handbills.136   
For Frankfurter, this case was a matter of the state being allowed to promote 
the public good—in this instance, patriotism and a strong sense of national 
pride—in the face of a challenge by a few individuals. 
The reactions to this decision were heated.  On the one hand, many saw 
this case as an instance of betrayal by the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Their lodges 
were burned, and one Witness was even assaulted as a wave of violence broke 
out against them in the wake of the decision.137  Reacting immediately to 
these developments, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Solicitor General Francis 
Biddle, and—two months later, in August 1940—FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover engaged in a public, well publicized defense of the Witnesses’ free-
doms.138  On June 8, 1942, Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy wrote an 
exceptional dissent in a case where the Court affirmed the constitutionality 
of a city ordinance requiring licenses and taxes for the selling of books and 
pamphlets imposed upon Jehovah’s Witnesses.  There, the Justices expressed 
that, despite being in the majority in Gobitis, they “now believe that it was 
also wrongly decided.”139  The time to overturn it came during the following 
term.  In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, they could join Stone 
and two new associate Justices—Robert H. Jackson and Wiley B. Rutledge—
on the Witnesses’ side. 
By a 6-3 vote, the Court overruled its previous decision in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis and found that public school pupils ought not to be forced to 
behave against their religious convictions.140  Jackson delivered the opinion 
of the Court, criticizing and rejecting Gobitis.  He argued: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citi-
zen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of Education not 
excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretion-
ary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the 
Bill of Rights.141 
“To the contrary,” observed Justice Jackson, “[w]e think the action of the 
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends consti-
tutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and 
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spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control.”142  Black concluded his concurring opinion 
in Barnette by rejecting “compelling little children to participate in a ceremony 
which ends in nothing for them but a fear of [spiritual] condemnation.”143 
The turnaround during the episode probably made a strong impression 
on the Court, especially on those members who reversed their opinions.  The 
struggle that led to the decision in that case and the jurisprudence which 
followed likely hinged on Justice Black and Justice Douglas—another 
switched vote—as they integrated the right of children to be exempt from 
coercion in any religious matter as a cornerstone of their jurisprudence, with 
both Justices continuing to defend it convincingly in years to come.144 
By 1962, they had Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan on their 
side.  In Engel,145 the Court was confirming Barnette, despite new popular mo-
bilizations.  One year after the Engel outcry, Brennan seized the opportunity 
presented by Schempp to go further and to examine the Court’s entire juris-
prudence regarding religion on historical and comparative grounds.  Bren-
nan also extended his inquiry beyond cases that dealt strictly with the two 
clauses, expanding his scope to all cases in which religion had had an impact, 
especially West Virginia v. Barnette. 
He found distinctions between spaces—public, semi-public, and pri-
vate—and audiences: for example, between adults and children.  He could 
also distinguish between the degrees of coercion individuals would confront 
in each situation to conform with some obligations related to religion, while 
paying attention to, for instance, whether someone would face serious reper-
cussions for not engaging in the relevant religious conduct.146 
Compare Barnette to a 1934 case, Hamilton v. Regents of the University of Cal-
ifornia.147  Both cases dealt with mandated behavior in educational institu-
tions.  In Barnette, the Court found that children ought not to be forced to 
behave against their religious convictions.148  Hamilton, on the other hand, 
concerned the objections of several religious students at the University of 
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California to mandatory instruction in military science and tactics.149  Bren-
nan found it significant “that Hamilton dealt with the voluntary attendance at 
college of young adults, while Barnette involved the compelled attendance of 
young children at elementary and secondary schools.  This distinction war-
rants a difference in constitutional results.”150 
While the former pertained to young children attending compulsory ele-
mentary school, the latter dealt with university students.  This distinction al-
lowed the Court to uphold the university’s required military training classes, 
at least in part, because when the students chose to apply to a particular pro-
gram they knew these requirements would be imposed on them. 
Brennan next turned to the difference between Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education151 and Zorach v. Clauson.152  Both cases involved released time 
for religious instruction of public school students.  But for Brennan, in 
McCollum, the problem was not so much—as it was for Black and the major-
ity—that the “program involved the regular use of school facilities, classrooms, 
heat and light and time from the regular school day . . . even though the actual 
incremental cost may have been negligible.”153  Instead, “[t]he deeper differ-
ence was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the pub-
lic school classroom and in precisely the position of authority held by the reg-
ular teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not.”154  As 
Brennan explained it, “the Constitution does not permit that prestige and ca-
pacity for influence to be augmented by investiture of all the symbols of au-
thority at the command of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular in-
struction.”155  Therefore, Engel and Schempp could be explained not as a step 
towards excluding religion from all state domains, but rather as an effort to 
account for the compulsory attendance of, or coercion on, minor children. 
B.  Brennan’s Frame is Tested: Children Remain Protected 
After Schempp, popular mobilization in favor of preserving religion in pub-
lic schools declined.  Perhaps the opinion of the Court—similar in its content 
to Engel, but different in tone and in how it was justified—played a role, illu-
minated as it was by Brennan’s opinion.  In the following years, the Justices 
continued to differ in the justifications they gave for their decisions—employ-
ing the Lemon, the non-endorsement, or the non-coercion test—depending 
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on the facts of the cases and the Justice writing for the majority.  However, 
all these different justifications led to a convergent common outcome: they 
fit with Brennan’s framework and did not stray from it in reaching their con-
clusions.  For example, in case after case the distinction between children and 
adults—and within that distinction, that between the space of the public 
school and other spaces, and between compulsory and voluntary attend-
ance—was confirmed. 
The first test for Brennan’s frame came twenty years after Schempp, with 
Marsh v. Chambers.  At stake was a legislative prayer program, led by a state-
financed chaplain who opened each session of the Nebraska legislature.156  
On this issue, the Brennan of Schempp had written:  
The saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or federal, 
and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might well represent no in-
volvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment Clause.  Legislators, 
federal and state, are mature adults who may presumably absent themselves 
from such public and ceremonial exercises without incurring any penalty, 
direct or indirect.157  
For the Brennan of 1963, minor children were to be treated differently than 
adults whose conscience is structured and mature, just as compulsory attend-
ance is different from voluntary attendance. 
But twenty years later, Brennan the analyst gave way to Brennan the 
fighter.  By 1983, the opinion he had written to add consistency to the Court’s 
jurisprudence had one effect: protecting children from religious interference 
in public schools.  It would not prevent him from steering the Court’s juris-
prudence around two consistent but distinct readings of the two clauses, each 
with its own philosophy, its own distinct and internal logic: his own reading 
of the Free Exercise Clause already expressed in a majority opinion in Sherbert 
was confirmed soon after in his dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger.158  Brennan 
argued that religious individuals and organizations have a constitutionally 
protected right to exercise their faith, even in the face of contrary laws or reg-
ulations, unless the government can establish a compelling interest to act.159  
His interpretation of the Establishment Clause,  defended “primarily in light 
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of his focus on the Free Exercise Clause,”160 was an endorsement of the Lemon 
test: it prevented  government involvement which would “undermine religion 
itself.”161  Therefore, in Marsh v. Chambers, Brennan found the legislative 
prayer of Nebraska “a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.”162  He 
held that there was “no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to 
apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would 
nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”163 
However, the majority of the Court did not follow him.  In Marsh, the 
Lemon test would not prevail because the Court chose to turn to history and 
to respect the long-standing tradition permitting legislative prayer.  Still, the 
Court’s new majority was willing to remain faithful to the Brennan of 1963. 
The Court’s reliance on Brennan’s Schempp concurrence appears, first, in 
the memo Justice Blackmun wrote to himself in Marsh.164  Blackmun recalled 
the three reasons suggested by Brennan in Schempp for considering that the 
appointment of legislative chaplains did not implicate “‘involvements of the 
kind prohibited by the Establishment Clause,’” including that “[l]egislators 
are mature adults who may, without penalty, absent themselves from these 
public ceremonies.”165  This adherence appeared even more clearly in the 
exchange of letters between Chief Justice Burger, author of the majority 
opinion, and Justice Blackmun, his friend on the Court.  At stake was a par-
agraph in Chief Justice Burger’s first draft circulated on May 26, 1983, which 
read, “The Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from regulating conduct 
simply because it ‘harmonizes with religious canons.’  And this is especially true 
where, as here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not 
readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination.’”166 
The danger for Blackmun was that the case would be seen as a signal that 
the Court was wavering on school prayer.  “As the sentence stands,” 
Blackmun told Burger, “it could suggest that the Establishment Clause might 
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not bar a State from conducting public prayers even when the individual 
claiming injury is a child—a result inconsistent with our prior cases.”167  
Later Blackmun observed that “because children are susceptible to religious 
indoctrination and peer pressure, school prayer presents what Arthur Gold-
berg called a ‘real threat,’ and not a ‘mere shadow,’”168 an allusion to Gold-
berg’s quotation at the end of the Chief Justice’s opinion, as to deny that the 
legislative prayer was a real threat. 
Blackmun told his clerk David Ogden that he was willing to do something 
“to cement-in the school prayer cases.”169  At Ogden’s suggestion, Blackmun 
asked Burger to excise the phrase “And this is especially true where, as” in the 
second sentence of the paragraph, which would then read “The Establishment 
Clause does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it ‘harmonizes 
with religious canons.’ . . . Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, 
presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination.’”170 
By June 3rd, Chief Justice Burger accepted the change requested by 
Blackmun at which point David Ogden could write to Blackmun that he felt 
“that the opinion now suggests that the school prayer cases are still good law and 
will make clear that legislative prayer is to stick to its historical roots and may be 
barred if it seriously threatens the values of the Establishment Clause.”171  As 
this exchange of letters makes clear, the Justices in the Marsh majority con-
firmed the distinction between children and adults. 
The second test for Brennan’s frame came when Justice Kennedy con-
firmed the continuing relevance of this Marsh distinction in 1992 with Lee v. 
Weisman.172  The case was heard on November 6, 1991.  When the Justices 
met in conference to discuss the case two days later, Kennedy’s vote brought 
the 5-4 majority against the claimant, in favor of allowing the prayer at a 
middle school graduation ceremony.  Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned Ken-
nedy the Court’s opinion.  But after working on it for four months, Kennedy 
decided to shift sides.173  On March 30, 1992, he wrote to Blackmun, “After 
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writing to reverse in the high school graduation prayer case, my draft looked 
quite wrong.  So I have written it to rule in favor of the objecting student.”174  Then 
he told Blackmun, “[a]fter the barbs in [County of Allegheny v. ACLU], many 
between the two of us, I thought it most important to write something that 
you and I and the others who voted this way can join.”175  Kennedy then 
circulated five successive drafts to incorporate the suggestions of Blackmun, 
Stevens, Souter, and O’Connor, the other four Justices in the majority.  In 
the majority opinion he delivered on June 24, 1992, he relied again on the 
criteria of non-coercion.  However, in County of Allegheny, he had expressed 
that coercion could manifest itself in three ways: (1) taxation, (2) “direct com-
pulsion to observance,” or (3) indirectly through “governmental exhortation 
to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing.”176  Blackmun was not 
convinced by this non-coercion theory.  But he vigorously rejected the use of 
the “proselytization” approach as a metric for indirect religious constraint or 
coercion, an approach that Kennedy had borrowed from Marsh v. Chambers177 
and had generalized to all Establishment cases.178  Here, in Lee v. Weisman the 
pressure on the student was “subtle and indirect.”179  However, Kennedy had 
abandoned “proselytization.”  The concept does not appear anywhere in his 
opinion and never appears again in any of Kennedy’s further  opinions with 
the exception of Town of Greece, a case of legislative prayer directly connected 
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 175 Letter from Anthony Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harry Blackmun, Asso-
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(Mar. 30, 1992) (on file with Library of Congress, Harry Blackmun Papers, Box 586, Folder 6). 
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faith or belief.”  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). 
 178 Blackmun took issue with Kennedy’s characterization of the public religious display in County of 
Allegheny as analogous to Marsh, as if the allowance of legislative chaplains had opened the door to 
all forms of government endorsement as long as it does not cross over into overt coercion or prose-
lytization.  Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602–03.  Blackmun argued that Kennedy’s “claim that 
prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates against 
Christians in favor of nonadherents must fail. . . . [I]t simply permits the government to 
acknowledge the holiday without expressing an allegiance to Christian beliefs, an allegiance that 
would truly favor Christians over non-Christians.”  Id. at 611–12. 
 179 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992). 
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to Marsh v. Chambers.180  Thanks to this move, Kennedy could rally a majority 
of the Court, for this case did not require the Justices  “to revisit the difficult 
questions dividing us in recent cases, questions of the definition and full scope 
of the principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the 
State for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens.”181  The 
issue was about minor children in public schools and “[o]ur decisions in Engel 
v. Vitale and School Dist. of Abington recognize, among other things, that prayer 
exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”182 
Kennedy was persisting with the use of the “coercion test,” but he quoted 
also the Lemon test and the non-endorsement test, with all three integrated 
into his use of Brennan’s frame in Schempp considering spaces, publics and 
degrees of constraint.   
Justice Kennedy would always continue to stand with the distinction be-
tween adults and children.  In Town of Greece v. Galloway, citing Marsh, he reit-
erated it.  For him, children are younger and impressionable—they want to 
conform to authority figures through the standards those figures set out, in-
cluding examples of religious observance from which they should be protected. 
Adults often encounter speech they find disagreeable—an offense that does 
not equate to coercion.  An Establishment Clause violation is not made out 
any time a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of con-
trary religious views in a legislative forum.  The presence of non-believers was 
not compulsory; they could “choose to exit the room during a prayer they find 
distasteful, their absence will not stand out as disrespectful or even noteworthy.  
And should they remain, their quiet acquiescence will not, in light of our tra-
ditions, be interpreted as an agreement with the words or ideas expressed.”183 
III.  CONSCIENCE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT 
From Barnette to Town of Greece, the protection of children in public institution 
against any faith-related pressure has become a fundamental feature of the ju-
risprudence on religion.  This concern for the protection of children emerged—
after Gobitis—from political and social mobilization and counter-mobilization 
in the name of conscience.  Interestingly it is in that same name that, fifty years 
later, after another political and social mobilization, Smith was de facto reversed. 
	
 180 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816, 1819, 1824 (2014).   
 181 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586 (1992); see also Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment 
Clause, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1632 (2006) (“The coercion test was the sole basis for the 
decision in Lee.  The Court held that it need not consult the other tests for Establishment Clause 
violations because ‘at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise’ and the school policy in question failed 
this threshold requirement.” (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587)). 
 182 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592 (citations omitted). 
 183 Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1827. 
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A.  From Barnette to Smith: Counter Mobilizations in the Name of Conscience 
In 1940, after the Court decided Gobitis, an anti-liberal reaction arose 
against the religious liberty of minorities.  In response, a political counter-
mobilization succeeded, leading to Barnette. 
The most active reaction to the Court’s decision in Gobitis as anathema 
to civil liberties came from the political sphere—in that case from the execu-
tive: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Attorney General, and the Depart-
ment of Justice.  Just after Gobitis was delivered, Robert Jackson, the Attorney 
General, expressed his disgust for the decision.  Gobitis was also thwarting the 
strategy of Roosevelt to emphasize what would become his “four freedoms” 
speech.  In his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1941, Roosevelt—
then at the height of his power—committed to building a “world founded 
upon four essential human freedoms”, the first two of which were “freedom 
of speech and expression everywhere in the world” and “freedom of every 
person to worship.”184  To fight Nazism, America wanted to become “the 
great arsenal for democracy,” and priority was given to “a national commit-
ment to expressive freedom and religious worship above all other constitu-
tional duties.”185  This insistence on the importance of the individual liberties 
enshrined in  the First Amendment would guide Roosevelt’s appointments 
to the Supreme Court. 
In 1941, Justice Stone, the lone dissenter in Gobitis, was elevated to Chief 
Justice, and Robert Jackson—an early opponent to Gobitis—took Stone’s seat 
as Associate Justice.  When a new seat became vacant in 1942, Roosevelt 
chose Wiley Rutledge over Learned Hand, the highly respected Chief Judge 
of the Second Circuit and close friend of Frankfurter.  Rutledge had become 
known for harshly criticizing Gobitis a few days after it was decided, despite 
being a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit: “We forget [ ] . . . that it is [in] the 
regimentation of children in the Fascist and Communist salutes that the very 
freedom for which Jehovah’s Witnesses strive has been destroyed.”186 
The executive actively sought another case in which the Court’s previous 
work could be reversed until they found Barnette.  The next pivotal moment 
of popular counter-mobilization would take place fifty years later in the wake 
of the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 
Again, an active Democratic reaction to a Court decision in the name of 
a fundamental freedom forced the Court to a de facto reversal.  Smith found 
that the state of Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to an individual 
	
 184 Tsai, supra note 138, at 386. 
 185 Id. at 389–90. 
 186 Id. at 400 (alterations in orginal). The fact that reversing Gobitis was a key factor in Roosevelt’s 
choice of Rutledge is confirmed by Gerald Gunther. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE 
MAN AND THE JUDGE 564–67 (1994).   
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fired for violating the state’s prohibition on peyote, even if the use of peyote 
was tied to a religious ritual.187  Smith became a landmark case because it 
faced an intense “popular” mobilization, which came as a surprise for the 
Court. The Court did not picture their decision as the pivotal one of the 
1989-90 term.  As Stephen Carter and Marci Hamilton have shown,188 from 
1963 to 1990, “[a] literal handful of cases” 189 applied the strict scrutiny de-
manded in Sherbert.  Aside from Yoder, which was just the most famous, there 
was only one area in which the Court ruled in favor of claimants who sought 
accommodations—unemployment compensation cases, in the line of Sherbert 
v. Verner.  In three additional cases, the Justices decided that, if an employer 
refuses to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of an employee and 
the employee is subsequently dismissed or leaves her job, the state could not 
deny unemployment compensation.190 
However, in Bowen v. Roy (1986), the Court refused to enjoin the statutory 
requirement that state agencies use people’s Social Security numbers, despite 
protestation by several Native American plaintiffs that the application of such 
labels to their children violated their religious liberty.191  Likewise, in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), the Court found that the 
U.S. Forest Service’s construction of a road on sacred land “may make it 
more difficult to practice” one’s religion but will not “coerce individuals into 
acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”192  Justice O’Connor, writing for 
the Court, argued that the program did not “prohibit the free exercise of 
religion” and, foreshadowing Justice Scalia in Smith, that  
	
 187 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 188 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 216-218 
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 189 HAMILTON, supra note 188, at 216. 
 190 See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830, 835 (1989) (holding that the State had 
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Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138, 141, 146 (1987) (applying the Sherbert 
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days for religious reasons, was entitled to unemployment compensation); Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 710, 718, 720 (1981) (utilizing the strict scrutiny standard and 
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a job that involved working with weapons for religious reasons); see also Carter, supra note 188, at 
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is subsequently dismissed, the state cannot deny unemployment compensation.”). 
 191 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695, 712 (1986). 
 192 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). 
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[t]he Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various 
competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere reli-
gious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours.  That task, to 
the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions.193 
However, in the months following Smith, Congress reacted to this creep 
in the jurisprudence and Justice Scalia’s opinion that nondiscriminatory re-
ligious-practice exemptions should be left to the political process.194  Follow-
ing strong academic criticisms of Smith led by Professor Douglas Laycock and 
Michael W. McConnell,195 the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion—
comprised of dozens of organizations, including the ACLU, the Traditional 
Values Coalition, the National Association of Evangelicals, the National 
Council on Islamic Affairs, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 
and the Native American Church of North America—was created.196  Con-
gress quickly united around the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
and later, in 2000, around the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (“RLUIPA”) to affirm the country’s commitment to religious liberty.  
In Congress, the most active advocates for the RFRA and RLUIPA came 
from the Democratic Party.  RFRA was introduced on March 11, 1993 by 
Representative Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York, on behalf of 
himself and 170 cosponsors.  The same day, a companion bill was introduced 
in the Senate by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.).  The bill was well received 
by dozens of newspaper and magazine articles recognizing RFRA “as a rem-
edy to the erosion of religious legal rights resulting from Smith.”197 
Interestingly, victory was achieved after Gobitis and after Smith in the 
name of one principle: conscience.  In a memo sent to Roosevelt on June 3, 
	
 193 Id. at 452. 
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1940 after Gobitis, Attorney General Jackson highlighted Justice Stone’s po-
sition that the guarantee of religious freedom forbade the legislature to “com-
pel public affirmations which violate . . . religious conscience.”198 
Roosevelt then underscored repeatedly in his correspondence with mem-
bers of the clergy and civic leaders “his commitment to ‘freedom of con-
science, as written into the Federal Constitution.’”199  When Barnette was fi-
nally decided, interestingly, Justice Jackson did not endorse Justice Stone’s 
approach in Gobitis, which advocated for an exemption from state compul-
sion if the state violated an individual’s religious conviction.  It would have 
given a “special constitutional bonus to religious dissenters”200 in violation of 
the Establishment Clause.  Instead, Jackson endorsed Frankfurter’s view that 
the flag salute was a secular regulation, but a bad one, that constrains free-
dom of the mind and of conscience. 
“[F]or scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ-
ual,” observed Justice Jackson, “we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source.”201  Then he contrasted “[t]he action of Congress in making flag ob-
servance voluntary and respecting the conscience of the objector in a matter 
so vital as raising the Army” with these local school regulations: “There are 
village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who acts under color 
of law is beyond reach of the Constitution.”202  Justice Black, joined by Justice 
Douglas, brought this point forward in his short but compelling concurrence 
to the case, writing: “Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to 
nothing but self-interest. . . . The ceremonial, when enforced against consci-
entious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a 
handy implement for disguised religious persecution.  As such, it is incon-
sistent with our Constitution’s plan and purpose.”203 
The word “conscience” penetrated the debate between the Justices.204  It 
appears twenty-eight times in the opinions of the different Justices, including 
in the majority opinion, as a guiding principle to justify where the protection 
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of the Jehovah’s witnesses comes from.205  Despite not being directly con-
nected with the religious clauses of the First Amendment, Barnette involved 
religious freedom in the name of freedom of conscience. 
Fifty years later, after a seeming reversal in Smith, the Court was brought 
back on track by another political and social movement.  As a consequence, 
most recently, in Hobby Lobby, the Court endorsed a conscience-based exemp-
tion and reemphasized the role of conscience in the jurisprudence of the Court 
on religion.206  It is in the name of the right to “conscience,” that the Court 
decided Barnette and Hobby Lobby.  In between, in 1985, Stevens had, in Wallace 
v. Jaffree, argued that “the Court has identified the individual’s freedom of conscience 
as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amend-
ment.”207  This statement was based on Cantwell but also—critically—on Bar-
nette.208  In his opinion, Stevens mentions that Barnette had been recently in-
voked by Chief Justice Burger “with the proposition that the right of freedom 
of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both 
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all” because 
“[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”209 
B.  Stevens’s Freedom of Conscience and the Court’s Religion Jurisprudence 
For Stevens, Barnette underscored that individual freedom of conscience, at 
the very least, protected the individual’s right to speak or remain silent.  Ste-
vens’s statement could be related to John Stuart Mill’s connection between free-
dom of conscience and freedom of expression.  Writing in On Liberty, Mill stated:  
[T]he appropriate region of human liberty . . . comprises, first, the inward 
domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience . . . . The liberty 
of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different 
principle . . . but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of 
thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically 
inseparable from it.210 
	
 205 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)  
(“Any spark of love for country which may be generated in a child or his associates by forcing him 
to make what is to him an empty gesture and recite words wrung from him contrary to his religious 
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lies.” (emphasis added)).  
 206 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding that requiring compa-
nies to “provid[e] health insurance that covers [particular] methods of birth control” substantially 
burdened the owners’ free “exercise of religion” as doing so contradicted their religious beliefs). 
 207 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (emphasis added).  
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 209 Id. at 51 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977)). 
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But was Stevens right to say that all First Amendment freedoms stemmed 
from the individual freedom of conscience—or, at least, that the Court’s ju-
risprudence on religion did so? 
Conscience was a central concern in the drafting of state and then federal 
constitutions in the United States.211  However, it was liberty of conscience, 
not freedom of conscience that constituted this concern.  Both John Witte, Jr. 
and Noah Feldman have emphasized that “[l]iberty of conscience was the 
general solvent used in the early American experiment in religious liberty.”212  
For Feldman, liberty of conscience “was the theoretical basis for both religion 
clauses and remained so even after the word ‘conscience’ disappeared from 
the draft language.”213 
But the affirmation of this liberty, which was present in the first drafts of 
the First Amendment, was deleted in its last and current version in favor of 
the right of free exercise.214  Still, the concept of liberty of conscience remained 
present in the minds of lawyers in the early Republic: for instance, in People v. 
Philips (1813),  against the prosecution who attempted to order a Catholic 
priest to disclose the content of a confession, a New York court held that Cath-
olic priests “‘are protected by the laws and constitution of this country, in the 
full and free exercise of their religion, and this court can never countenance 
or authorize the application of insult to their faith, or of torture to their con-
sciences.’”215  But the evolution of the language of the First Amendment and 
the ultimate choice of “free exercise” language over “conscience” language 
made such invocation of liberty of conscience increasingly rare.   
Freedom of conscience became a central term in more contemporary discus-
sions of religious freedom as a more individual—and not always religious—
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right.  “Freedom of conscience” appears in Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes’s 
dissent in United States v. Macintosh (1931), in which he defended the right of 
an alien who was trying to gain citizenship to refrain from uttering an oath.  
Hughes, joined by Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Oliver W. Holmes, em-
phasized that “the requirement of the oath of office should be read in the 
light of our regard from the beginning for freedom of conscience.”216 
After this opinion, “freedom of conscience” began appearing with greater 
frequency, in many other cases, such as Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940),217 Min-
ersville v. Gobitis (1940),218 and Schneiderman v. United States (1943),219 a denatu-
ralization case which was decided one week before Barnette.  
The outcry after Gobitis had demonstrated that a new realm, focused on 
the free individual’s conscience and the protection of her autonomy, needed 
protection.220  Until then, freedom of conscience had been present in the ju-
risprudence but only on its periphery.  Its newly central “signaling” role was 
the product of a very particular political mobilization.221 
Barnette was central to Justice Brennan’s 1963 frame—it is from Barnette 
that the distinction between children and adults arose.  But Brennan did not 
deduct “conscience” from his study of the jurisprudence.  In Sherbert, Brennan 
based his defense of religious exemption on the “appellant’s conscientious 
objection to Saturday work”222 and on reasons “having to do with matters of 
conscience or religion.”223  In his dissent in Marsh, Brennan stated that the 
first purpose of the Establishment Clause was to “guarantee the individual 
right to conscience.”224  He also mentioned that this purpose was “most 
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closely related to the more general conceptions of liberty found in the re-
mainder of the First Amendment.”225 
But it is Stevens who in Wallace v. Jaffree had the intuition and explicitly 
expressed that “individual’s freedom of conscience [i]s the central liberty that uni-
fies the various Clauses of the First Amendment.”226  In his key majority 
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy recognized the full strength of 
freedom of conscience in the Free Exercise Clause: “[t]he Free Exercise 
Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels 
in the speech provisions of the First Amendment.”227  For the Establishment 
Clause as well, Kennedy reiterated the distinction between children and 
adults in the name of freedom of conscience: “As we have observed before, 
there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from 
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.” 
Kennedy cited in support of this contention Schempp, Edwards v. Aguillard and 
Board of Education v. Mergens.228 
However, Stevens’s opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree did not provoke an intel-
lectual shock among his brethren.  The Court returned to its customary pro-
cess, dealing with the cases in light of each Clause.  The fact that individual 
freedom of conscience would—as a principle—unify the federal courts’ ju-
risprudence on religion has not come out explicitly in the Court’s jurispru-
dence as the use of Brennan’s distinction between spaces, publics and degrees 
of constraints had.  I can see one main reason for that: under the umbrella 
of freedom of conscience, Stevens applied the clauses in quite a mechanical 
way.  In Wallace v. Jaffree, for example, after affirming freedom of conscience 
as the principle unifying all the clauses, Justice Stevens assigned the case to 
the Establishment Clause and applied the Lemon test.  Stevens did not notice 
those of the religion cases in the Court jurisprudence—like Barnette—which 
were in tension or in contradiction with the clauses themselves.229 
C.  Individual Freedom of Conscience Subsumes the Law and Constitution 
Alexander Bickel in “The Morality of Consent” had emphasized the cen-
trality of an individual’s freedom of conscience in American jurisprudence.230  
	
 225 Id. 
 226  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 227 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992). 
 228  Id. at 592. 
 229 See Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The 
Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 121 (Richard W. Gar-
nett & Andrew Koppelman, eds. 2012) (arguing that Barnette “turns out to be surprisingly difficult 
to defend” as not having been either a case of free exercise or of non-establishment; its rationale is 
also not easy to find). 
230 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 91–111 (1975) (defining civil disobedience 
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Writing in the context of the Pentagon papers, Bickel stated that American 
law has traditionally recognized a certain autonomy of conscience, “some 
conscientious objections, particularly to war, although not to war alone.”231  
Bickel was referring to a 1965 case, United States v. Seeger,232 related to objec-
tion of conscience to the Vietnam War.  In the majority opinion in this case, 
Justice Tom Clark quoted Chief Justice Hughes, who remarked in 1931 that 
“in the forum of conscience, duty to moral power higher than the State has 
always been maintained,”233 and an article by Harlan Stone from 1919, 
which found that “[m]orals and sound policy require that the state should 
not violate the conscience of the individual.  All our history gives confirma-
tion to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which 
makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state.”234 
When joining the military became compulsory under the draft in 1916, 
the recognition of conscientious objections developed beyond the Selective 
Service Act’s exemption for members of pacifist religious sects to include in-
dividual claimants’—even atheists’—objection of conscience.  This exemp-
tion applied regardless of whether the claimants were sectarian or non-sec-
tarian, religious or non-religious, by executive and administrative action.  
The question was not so much of fundamental rights, but “of how best to 
discipline conscripts.”235 
But Bickel took Seeger in a higher direction.  “The unlawfulness of disobe-
dience to law on sincerely held grounds of conscience is frequently not taken 
as conclusive proof of the illegitimacy of disobedience.”236  Disobedience, to 
the contrary, “raises a question about the law at which it is directed, about 
its effectiveness, . . . its rightness, or at least its utility.”237 
Disobedience to the law: this is what the Court had in fact decided in the 
case following Seeger—Welsh v. United States—where, under the impulse of Jus-
tice Black, “religious” exemption was extended to non-religious beliefs so 
deeply embedded in the mind that they are like religious beliefs.238  This was 
done against the express phrasing of the statute.  Justice Harlan, writing in a 
	
through the context of American history). 
 231 Id. at 94. 
 232 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 233 See BICKEL, supra note 230, at 94 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 170). 
 234 See id. at 94 (quoting Harlan Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U. Q. 253, 269 (1919)) 
(“So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man’s moral and spiritual 
nature that nothing short of self-preservation of the state should warrant its violation.”). 
 235 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 
1120 (2014); Stone served on the Board of Inquiry, which studied conscientious objections, under 
the Wilson administration during the First World War.  Id. at 1095. 
 236 BICKEL, supra note 230, at 94. 
 237 Id.  
 238 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
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strong concurring opinion, recalled that the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act of 1948 provided exemptions to persons who, “by reason of reli-
gious training and belief” were “conscientiously opposed to participation in 
war” but it expressly excluded the ones who opposed war for “essentially po-
litical, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral 
code.”239  Harlan thought the law should be declared unconstitutional for not 
guaranteeing equal treatment to all beliefs.  He reasoned that it was not in 
the power of the Court to declare it constitutional by redefining words so as 
to change and reverse the explicit intent of Congress.240 
But for Justice Black and the majority of the Court,  
[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or 
moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty 
of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those be-
liefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that 
filled by . . . God.’241 
Disobedience not simply to law but to the Constitution itself: this was what some 
Justices were defending—with the approval of numerous judges from federal 
courts, if not explicitly by the Supreme Court—in exceptional cases related 
again to the military but also to prisons in regard to chaplaincies. 
In Schempp, both Brennan and Stewart in their concurring and dissenting 
opinions, respectively, referred to chaplaincies in the military and in prisons 
and endorsed them as legitimate practices aiming to guarantee religious lib-
erty, even if violative of the Establishment Clause.  Justice Brennan stated in 
his concurrence: 
There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, 
the striking down of which might seriously interfere with certain religious lib-
erties also protected by the First Amendment.  Provisions for churches and 
chaplains at military establishments for those in the armed services may afford 
one such example.  The like provision by state and federal governments for 
chaplains in penal institutions may afford another example. It is argued that 
such provisions may be assumed to contravene the Establishment Clause, yet 
be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to secure to the members 
of the Armed Forces and prisoners those rights of worship guaranteed under 
the Free Exercise Clause.  Since government has deprived such persons of the 
opportunity to practice their faith at places of their choice, the argument runs, 
government may, in order to avoid infringing the free exercise guarantees, 
provide substitutes where it requires such persons to be.242 
	
 239  Id. at 346 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 240 Id. at 344–48 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 241 Id. at 340. 
 242 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296–98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
In a previous version of his opinion, Brennan had stated in the first sentence of this passage 
that “There are practices ostensibly violative of the Establishment Clause.”  William Brennan, School 
District of Abington v. Schempp 62 (preliminary draft) (on file with Library of Congress, William 
Brennan Papers, Box I-88) (emphasis added). 
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Justice Stewart expressed similar views in his dissent: 
[T]he fact is that while in many contexts the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause fully complement each other, there are areas in which 
a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable 
conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. 
A single obvious example should suffice to make the point. Spending fed-
eral funds to employ chaplains for the armed forces might be said to violate 
the Establishment Clause.  Yet a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway out-
post could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the 
opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exer-
cise of his religion.  And such examples could readily be multiplied.  The short 
of the matter is simply that the two relevant clauses of the First Amendment 
cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature 
may distort rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case.243 
The Supreme Court never took a case regarding chaplaincy in the army. 
However, if it had, the Court would also have had to consider that the mili-
tary bars such chaplains from proselytizing, an important aspect of many 
religious traditions. This restriction itself presents a seeming violation of the 
Constitution—this time the Free Exercise Clause, but it is a condition the 
Court already addressed in Chambers at the request of Justices Blackmun and 
O’Connor. Both Justices approved the constitutionality of legislative prayer 
in Nebraska on the condition that: “the forum provided to the chaplain was 
not exploited as a means of proselytizing.”244  Barring proselytism is, moreo-
ver, one of the key features of the current leading case on military chaplain-
cies, Katcoff v. Marsh (1985),245 and of all chaplaincies cases. 
	
 243 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 244 In Marsh v. Chambers, Chief Justice Burger consented to another change to his first draft, requested 
by Justices O’Connor and Blackmun, both concerned that the legislative chaplaincy could be used 
“to proselytize for a particular faith.”  Letter from Harry Blackmun, Associate Justice, U.S. Su-
preme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 31, 1983).  At the end 
of Burger’s opinion, when his first draft was saying “The content of the Nebraska prayers is not, and cannot 
be of concern to us,” the opinion would now say “The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as 
here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief” to the satisfaction of Blackmun.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
794 (1983) (emphasis added); Letter of David Ogden, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court to Harry 
Blackmun, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 3, 1983) (on file with Library of Congress, 
Harry Blackmun Papers, Box 382, Folder 8). 
 245 In Katcoff v. Marsh, the federal leading case, two Harvard law students brought a suit in 1979 arguing 
that military chaplains should be replaced with non-combat volunteers or contractors.  755 F.2d 
223, 224–25 (2d Cir. 1985).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the right of 
the military to employ chaplains.  Id. at 224.  The Second Circuit acknowledged that strict appli-
cation of the Lemon test in isolation would render the Army chaplaincy unconstitutional, as the 
“immediate purpose [of the chaplaincy] is to promote religion by making it available, albeit on a 
voluntary basis, to our armed forces.  Id. at 232.  The effect of the program, moreover, is to advance 
the practice of religion.”  Id.  However, the Court relied on the War Power Clause of Art. I, Sec. 8, 
which provides in pertinent part that Congress shall have the power to “provide for the common 
Defence,” “to raise and support Armies,” and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces.”  Id. at 233 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).  The Court also added,  
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In the most extreme situations of isolation, where all the freedoms of the 
First Amendment are suppressed or strictly restricted and where human be-
ings face the possibility of death or of absence of liberty, freedom of con-
science appears to be the absolute right that must be provided and guaran-
teed by the state, even though it is not expressly mentioned in the First 
Amendment and even when it apparently violates its plain text.  In the ex-
treme examples of involuntary confinement, using mainly public funds, pris-
ons provide chaplaincy services to inmates, while also conditioning the chap-
lains’ ability to live out their own faith by preventing them from proselytizing 
other inmates.  Next comes the military, where one can be drafted or en-
gaged, but from which one can be exempted in the name of conscience, 
whether religious or not.  Once one is in the military, however, public-funded 
chaplains—seemingly in violation of the Establishment Clause—provide for 
the religious needs of soldiers, and again the military bars chaplains from 
proselytizing, an important aspect of many religious traditions and seemingly 
a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
These scenarios have nothing to do with the situations Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg categorized in Cutter v. Wilkinson as having “‘room for play in the 
joints between’ the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.”246  She was 
quoting Justice Rehnquist in her opinion, who—in a case involving a publicly 
funded scholarship which excluded students pursuing a degree in devo-
tional theology—stated that, “there are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”247  
These cases, though, appear to conflict directly with the express provisions 
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses—they are not “in the joints.” 
In the cases of confinement, even if it is not what the Constitution expresses 
formally, there is a higher principle, which requires the state to provide the 
possibility of ‘practicing’ freedom of conscience (e.g., dialogue, individual 
prayer, or confession with chaplains).  Freedom of conscience stands then as 
the only freedom guaranteed to persons in exceptional situations, despite its 
tension with or the violation of a formal reading of the First Amendment. 
Therefore, the role and the meaning of freedom of conscience go beyond 
what Stevens had envisioned it—just as a principle unifying all clauses of the 
First Amendment. 
	
No chaplain is authorized to proselytize soldiers or their families. The chaplain’s principal 
duties are to conduct religious services (including periodic worship, baptisms, marriages, 
funerals and the like), to furnish religious education to soldiers and their families, and to 
counsel soldiers with respect to a wide variety of personal problems.  
  Id. at 228. 
 246 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 US 712, 718 (2004)). 
 247 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
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IV.  INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE UNIFIES THE RELIGION 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT 
Up to this point, I have tried to provide a historical account of changes 
in the Court’s religion jurisprudence.  Now, however, I propose a conceptual 
interpretation that can make sense of the historical account. 
What is happening in the Court’s religion jurisprudence can be summa-
rized in three propositions: 
1. Freedom of conscience serves as an organizing principle for religion 
jurisprudence in all circumstances—those in which the individual 
can move freely between spaces, and those in which she cannot. 
2. Where the individual can move freely between spaces, freedom of 
conscience operates by organizing the different clauses of the First 
Amendment, by differentiating between spaces, publics and degrees 
of coercion. 
3. Where the individual cannot freely move between spaces, freedom of 
conscience operates by trumping those clauses in order to guarantee 
a positive right of conscience. 
A.  Freedom of Conscience Within Brennan’s Framework 
When a person is confined to a closed space from which there is either 
no possibility to reach a place of worship, such as in prisons, or no easy pos-
sibility, such as for those serving in the military, the state provides such a 
person resources to preserve the basic right of conscience which she has in 
normal daily life, when she can freely move between different spaces. 
This differentiation and circulation characterizes liberal societies by com-
bining different spheres of norms and freedoms, built through the art of sep-
aration that permits the emergence and the guarantees of liberties and inde-
pendence toward political power.248  To understand the world of adults 
outside prisons and in the military, we can refer to ancient Greece.  Marcel 
Hénaff and Tracy B. Strong differentiate between four kinds of spaces orga-
nized by human beings in relation to deities, and these spaces speak accu-
rately to the modern situation: private, sacred, common, and public: 
A space is private when a given individual or set of individuals are recog-
nized by others as having the right to establish criteria that must be met for 
anyone else to enter it. . . . 
. . . . 
	
 248 See Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315, 315 (1984) (discussing 
how liberal theorists’ “art of separation” produces different spheres of activity and liberties). 
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 Sacred space is . . . . [the] space of the gods. . . . not subject to secular legal 
processes, for such spaces were not under human control.  
. . . Common space admits of no criteria; it is open to all in the same way.  
It is not owned or controlled. . . . [A]ll can go there to extract from it what 
is there.  Thus the sea, pastures, forests are (or can be) common space.  This 
is not a space to which one goes to speak with others. . . . common space is 
not public space, for it not a human construct. 
. . . . 
. . . Public space is a human construct, an artifact, the result of the attempt by 
human beings to shape the place and thus the nature of their interac-
tions. . . .  
. . . [I]t is [also] theatrical, in that it is a place which is seen and shows one-
self to others.249 
In the contemporary United States, private and sacred spaces are similar, 
while the Greek common space has become a public space in which all kinds 
of beliefs can be expressed, and the Greek public space has become the state 
and the political one.  And the two religion clauses, which simultaneously 
guarantee freedom of religion and freedom from religion, help organize the 
distinction between spaces without fixing the limits of each space and the 
level of religious presence or autonomy, which remains a matter of conflict 
and interpretation. 
In the sacred (i.e., religious space especially guaranteed by the Free Exer-
cise Clause and reinforced by RLUIPA),250 the Court protects the rights of 
religious organizations to make autonomous decisions in matters of govern-
ance,251 and the selection of members and clergy;252 it shields such organiza-
tions from anti-discrimination regulations for  employees or employees not 
	
 249 Marcel Hénaff & Tracy B. Strong, Introduction: The Conditions of Public Space: Vision, Speech and Theat-
ricality, in PUBLIC SPACE AND DEMOCRACY 2–5 (Marcel Hénaff & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2001). 
 250 It is fascinating to notice that in RLUIPA, Congress has implicitly agreed on the Brennan’s distinc-
tion of spaces, publics and degrees of constraint by precisely targeting some spaces—prisons and 
religious land use—to lift any substantial burden on the religious exercise (unless there is a compel-
ling governmental interest and the least restrictive means have been used for furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest).  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).  It is also important to notice that a 
previous bill, The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998 (“RLPA”), introduced as H.R. 4019 
and S. 2148 in the 105th Congress, which was not targeting specific areas but would have lifted 
substantially the burden on a person’s religious exercise in any local or state program or activity, 
operated by a government, that receives federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability, did not pass.  In its original version, RLPA could have undermined 
many state and local civil rights laws. 
 251 See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) 
(explaining that “the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in 
resolving church property disputes”). 
 252 Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696, 698 (1976) (holding that the Illinois 
Supreme Court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by inquiring into “matters of eccle-
siastical cognizance and polity” when it determined that proceedings surrounding removal of a 
Bishop were defective). 
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involved in religious activities.253  At the same time, as we have seen, the 
Establishment Clause justifies the Court’s refusal to accept in public schools, 
in the name of individual freedom of conscience, the submission of children 
to ceremonies that could impress or affect them.254  It also justifies a religious 
presence in the state and political space.  In the political sphere, there are 
large margins of appreciation left to the political body.  For example, legisla-
tures are free to hold organized prayers, thanks to Marsh v. Chambers—re-
cently reaffirmed in Galloway—but they are also free not to do so and to de-
fend a stricter separationist approach to the Establishment Clause.  
Nevertheless, no conscience right can be claimed to overturn this policy 
choice as unconstitutional, for adults can face conflicting environments 
which are not permanent, central, or compulsory and does not proselytize. 
The range of cases that deals with monuments and symbols is instructive.  
Explicitly religious installations, when they are central (even if temporary), 
are banned—like a crèche on a county courthouse’s front steps.255  Con-
fronted with two different public displays of the Ten Commandments, the 
Court only invalidated the one—in McCreary—that was recent and appeared 
too central.256  In McCreary, visible copies of the Ten Commandments had 
been installed in 1999 in two Kentucky county courthouses and in a school 
district in a third county.257  The Court approved the other display in Van 
Orden.  In that case, the display was part of the cultural landscape—it had 
been standing for forty years—and its presence, in the words of Justice Breyer 
(the decisive vote in both cases), “in a large park containing 17 monuments 
and 21 historical markers, all designed to illustrate the ‘ideals’ of those who 
settled in Texas and of those who have lived there since that time” could not 
have been seen as an establishment or an endorsement.258  “In God We 
Trust” on currency and “under God” in the Pledge have become, despite 
some protest, signs of a national civic religion and a general invocation of 
	
 253 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012); 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 337–39 (1987) (invoking the two religion clauses of the First Amendment to justify the exemp-
tion). 
 254 Here, when conscience fully applies as a limit to constraint, the different interpretations of the Es-
tablishment Clause all end in the same conclusion. 
 255 See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that the crèche, given its position, 
had the unconstitutional effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs, while a menorah in a 
different “physical setting” did not). 
 253 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 
681–83 (2005) (finding that an observer to the monument would not, in context, view it as a state 
endorsement of religion).  For an overview of the facts and issues at stake in the cases, see Mike 
Schaps, Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1254–60 (2006). 
 257 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850. 
 258 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702. 
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God that is unlikely to unduly burden the conscience of any adult.  But in 
these cases, the Court’s jurisprudence is fragile and Justices themselves rec-
ognize a degree of appreciation.259 
In relation to public institutions in which one can voluntarily engage, di-
vergent scruples of conscience cannot be easily invoked with the backing of 
the Court.  A college student cannot claim such scruples in a higher educa-
tion program that he has chosen freely to apply to, even if that program im-
poses military training.260  And, more recently and controversially, a county 
clerk cannot refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the name 
of her religious beliefs.261  Conscience remains as a limit forbidding the use 
of public tax for permanent and compulsory religious purposes, like subsidies 
to religious schools or teachers.  It has been associated since Madison wrote 
his great Memorial and Remonstrance with the fact that “the best interest of 
a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free.”262  Recently, 
the Court has significantly reduced the impact of Flast v. Cohen, which held 
that a taxpayer has standing to sue the government to prevent an unconsti-
	
 259 In his concurrence in Schempp, Justice Brennan suggests that American citizens have interwoven the 
motto “In God We Trust” “so deeply into the fabric of [the] civil polity that its present use may 
well not present that type of involvement which the First Amendment prohibits.”  Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963).  Responding to a letter from Adolf Grunbaum, (professor at 
University of Pittsburgh), challenging his statement, Justice Brennan wrote: “I concede that there 
may be more than one answer to the problem you discuss.  What is constitutionally an impermissi-
ble ‘danger of involvement’ may itself be a matter of degree.  That at least was the approach I 
attempted to suggest.”  Letter from William Brennan, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to 
Adolph Grunbaum, Professor, University of Pittsburgh (Sept. 7, 1963) (on file with Library of Con-
gress, William Brennan papers, Box I 89). 
260  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661, 668–69 (2010) (holding that a college may deny funding to a student group with a selective 
membership policy). 
 261 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (declaring that states must recognize lawful 
same-sex marriages performed in other states).  After Obergefell was decided, a county clerk of Ro-
wan County, Kim Davis, refused to issue marriage licenses to any couple, same-sex or opposite-sex.  
Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 at 929, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015).  On July 1, 2015, the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky representing four couples, two same-sex and two opposite-sex, 
filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against Kim Davis.  ACLU 
of Kentucky Files Class Action Suit Against Rowan County and its Clerk, ACLU (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-kentucky-files-class-action-suit-against-rowan-county-and-its-
clerk.  On August 12, 2015, Judge David L. Bunning issued a preliminary injunction ordering her to 
issue marriage licenses to any qualified couple.  Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 944.  Davis immediately 
appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  On August 26, a 
unanimous three-judge panel composed of Judges Damon J. Keith, John M. Rogers, and Bernice B. 
Donald denied the stay pending appeal.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, 2015 WL10692640, at *1–2 
(Aug. 25, 2016).  Davis turned then to the Supreme Court, which, on August 31, 2015, with no 
dissent, declined to stay the district court’s ruling.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Kentucky Clerk Must 
Let Gay Couples Marry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/us/su-
preme-court-says-kentucky-clerk-must-let-gay-couples-marry.html?mcubz=0. 
 262 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947). 
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tutional use of tax funds allocated to parochial schools in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause.263  In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 
the Court declared that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge Arizona’s 
provision of tax credits to donors of school tuition organizations, which pro-
vide scholarships to students attending private or religious schools.264  For 
Justice Kennedy, following James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessment’s path,265 “that tax credits and governmental expenditures 
can have similar economic consequences,” but they have to remain distin-
guished as they “do not both implicate individual taxpayers in sectarian ac-
tivities.  A dissenter whose tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’ knows that 
he has in some small measure been made to contribute to an establishment 
in violation of conscience.”266 
In fact, for the Court, conscience includes the highest dimension of reli-
gious belief.  It does not cover every thought or action related to religion.  In 
a confined area like the military, one could not successfully make a con-
science claim for wearing a yarmulke, associated with “desires,” “interests,” 
and “personal preferences.”267  For Justice Rehnquist, the First Amendment 
[d]oes not require the military to accommodate such practices in the face of 
its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress reg-
ulations.  The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious ap-
parel that is visible and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of 
the regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress 
in the interest of the military’s perceived need for uniformity.268 
In semi-public forums, an organization claiming to be Christian or reli-
gious cannot, in the name of conscience, be exempted from an antidiscrimina-
tion regulation, when the Court finds it is an issue of free speech and not of 
	
 263 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). 
 264 563 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2011). 
 265 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163,  
 266 Id. at 141–42 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).  Justice Sotomayor employed a similar reasoning, invok-
ing freedom of conscience and violation of the Establishment Clause, in her dissent in Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).  In that case, at the joints between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Court decided that the exclusion of a religious entity from 
a state grant related to the improvement of a playground violated the Free Exercise Clause, as it was 
forcing the entity to choose “between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”  Id. 
at 2023 (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004)).  The Court decided to consider not 
what the entity was—i.e. religious—but what it was doing: opening a playground to children of all 
or no faith, in a preschool and daycare center (i.e., at an early age, when they cannot be submitted 
to a religious indoctrination).  Moreover, the fact that the decision was limited in scope to a play-
ground shows the Court’s attention to its earlier jurisprudence (the Court did not want to open the 
door to the financing of sectarian activities by governmental expenditures).  Id. 
 267 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 69 (1996). 
 268 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (permitting the Military to forbid required 
religious headgear). 
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free exercise of religion.269  On the other hand, in the name of free speech, the 
Court has authorized a public university to support a range of publications, 
including religious ones, as soon as they met the funding-eligibility criteria.270 
Religious identity can, however, be defended and protected in an antidis-
crimination framework.  The First Amendment affords religious groups a zone 
of protection from state interference in decisions about their internal govern-
ance.  It is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protects employees 
and applicants from adverse treatment by employers.  Title VII says that an 
employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin,”271 except if such accommodation proves an “undue hardship.”272  In 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the case of a 
Muslim woman turned down for a job at a clothing retailer because her head-
scarf would violate the store’s “Look Policy.”273  Holding that a job applicant 
need only show that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor 
in her employer’s adverse decision and that the employer need not know that 
it was a religious accommodation, the Court also found that the EEOC accom-
modation requirements applied even to facially neutral policies: 
Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious prac-
tices—that they be treated no worse than other practices.  Rather, it gives 
them favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail or 
refuse to hire or discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s” 
“religious observance and practice.”  An employer is surely entitled to have, 
for example, a no-headwear policy as an ordinary matter.  But when an ap-
plicant requires an accommodation as an “aspec[t] of religious . . . practice,” 
it is no response that the subsequent “fail[ure] . . . to hire” was due to an 
otherwise-neutral policy.  Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to 
give way to the need for an accommodation.274 
Freedom of conscience, the common denominator of the jurisprudence 
of the Court, the core dimension of religious belief, guarantees the freedom 
of conscience of religious and non-religious people.  Guided by the clauses of 
	
 269 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 674 (2010) (upholding a law school’s policy of re-
fusing to officially recognize a Christian student group unless it agreed to openly accept all members). 
 270 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840–41, 843–44 (1995) (finding 
that a public university’s refusal to allow printing funds to be used by a Christian publication was 
unconstitutional if all other qualifications for funding were satisfied); see also McCreary Cty. v. 
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (“[L]imits on governmental action that might make sense 
as a way to avoid establishment could arguably limit freedom of speech when the speaking is done 
under government auspices.” (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819)). 
 271 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016). 
 272 EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015). 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. at 2034 (alterations in original). 
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the First Amendment, freedom of conscience sets the limit of public and pri-
vate intervention in religious issues, depending on location, degree of con-
straint, and the publics involved.  It also set the limits of divergence between 
Justices in the interpretation of each clause. 
Therefore, if we take Kennedy’s central proposition that “whatever 
standard the Court applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least 
suggest results consistent with our precedents and the historical practices 
that, by tradition, have informed our First Amendment jurisprudence,”275  
then Justice Stevens seems correct in writing that “the individual’s freedom 
of conscience [i]s the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the 
First Amendment.”276  It even goes beyond unifying them; it also trumps 
them when conscience is at risk. 
But when, in the most recent and controversial exemption case (Hobby 
Lobby), conscience was also affirmed, was it the same “conscience” intended 
by Stevens—a choice made by an individual for him or herself?277  This is 
not exactly what happened in the Hobby Lobby case, where the Court decided 
that the conscience of a person could concern or extend to a closely held for-
profit corporation, which have sincere beliefs preventing them to facilitate 
access to contraception for their employees.278 
The Court could have used the term “conscience” because of its polysemy.  
At least the existence of two competing conceptions of conscience was em-
phasized by Michael J. Sandel in a direct and explicit reaction to Stevens’s 
majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, which Sandel developed in Democracy’s 
Discontent (1996).279  In a long and important comment, Sandel criticizes Jus-
tice Stevens’s opinion, as the “most explicit statement of the voluntarist con-
ception of religious liberty” in the Court’s history, for confusing freedom of 
conscience with freedom of choice, for making religious beliefs worthy of re-
spect, “not in virtue of what they are beliefs in, but rather in virtue of . . . being 
beliefs of a self unencumbered by convictions antecedent to choice.”280  For 
	
 275 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989). 
 276 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute that authorized a period 
of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer”).  Previously, in his majority opinion in Schempp, 
Justice Clark has mentioned that the clauses overlap because they both require neutrality.  Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).  But he did not construct neutrality as a common 
principle covering the two clauses, beyond the Establishment Clause.  Id.  
 277 Jaffree, 472 U. S. at 50. 
 278 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
 279 SANDEL, supra note 267, at 63–64. Conscience has a variety of definitions and interpretations de-
veloped, for example, in Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 
15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 226–31 (2009).  Inspired by Koppelman, id., and Jesse H. Choper, Defining 
“Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (1982), I would say that the courts 
have considered conscience as an innermost conviction of its possessor about what is morally right 
in relation to life and death. 
 280 SANDEL, supra note 267, at 63–64. 
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Sandel, Barnette is in fact the first sign of the “procedural republic” in which 
patriotism is a “matter of choice, not of inculcation,” where “the Supreme 
Court assumed as its primary role the protection of individual rights against 
government infringement.”281  Freedom of conscience as “respect for persons’ 
freedom to choose their religious convictions for themselves”282 (i.e. individual 
choice in matters of religion) underlies important Court decisions such as 
Cantwell or Schempp.  Stevens reemphasized the latter two by stating that 
[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of 
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select 
any religious faith or none at all.  This conclusion derives support not only 
from the interest in respecting the individual’s freedom of conscience, but 
also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the prod-
uct of free and voluntary choice by the faithful . . . .283 
For Sandel, conscience is not always a matter of individual choice.  He 
rightly recalls that, originally, Madison and Jefferson understood religious 
liberty “as the right to exercise religious duties according to the dictates of con-
science, not the right to choose religious beliefs.”284  Sandel quotes the first sen-
tence of Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom”: “the opinions 
and belief of men depend not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the 
evidence proposed to their own minds.”285  And it is precisely because belief 
is not governed by the will that Sandel considers freedom of conscience inal-
ienable.  He concedes that the Supreme Court has—in certain cases—ac-
corded respect to what he called “encumbered selves.”286  Among these cases, 
Sandel mentions Wisconsin v. Yoder.  In that case, the Court found that, due 
to Amish parents’ fundamental right to freedom of religion, their children 
could be exempted from mandatory public schooling after the eighth grade 
to keep their religious tradition alive.287 
The express purpose of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was “to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”288  In Yoder, claims of individ-
ual conscience are oriented toward third parties and impose conduct on 
them—here, children of the claimants—in the name of imperative religious 
	
 281 Id. at 54–55. 
 282 Id. at 62. 
 283 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985); see also SANDEL, supra note 267, at 63 (quoting Wallace, 
472 U.S. at 52–53 (1985)). 
 284 SANDEL, supra note 267, at 65 (emphasis added). 
 285 Id.  
 286 Id. at 68–69 (describing cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed individuals’ rights to prac-
tice their religion). 
 287 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).  
 288 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (citations omitted). 
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scruples.289  Bearing this in mind, Hobby Lobby can appear to be the heir to 
Yoder, one of the cases quoted and endorsed by RFRA.  However, an exam-
ination of the historical record of Yoder and an analysis of the process that led 
to the final versions of the different opinions will help us examine this case 
from a different angle, one where freedom of religion—in the name of con-
science—cannot be imposed upon or harm another individual conscience. 
B.  Yoder, a Misinterpreted Parent of Hobby Lobby 
The Court heard oral arguments for Wisconsin v. Yoder on December 8, 
1971,290 and it deliberated in conference on December 10, 1971.291  Only 
seven Justices were present, as Rehnquist and Powell were either not ap-
pointed or not yet confirmed.  The Court unanimously agreed to affirm the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which the State of Wisconsin 
had appealed. 
Chief Justice Burger selected himself to write the opinion and on April 7, 
1972, sent a first draft to his colleagues.292  After reading it, Potter Stewart 
wrote to him that he was in “basic agreement” with his “admirably thorough 
opinion,” but expressed two reservations.293  First, he suggested that “since 
the case involves . . . state laws, . . . there should be a specific reference to the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the first paragraph of the opinion.”294  His main 
concern, however, was the invocation of “parental direction” as a constitu-
tional right.295  “To be sure,” he added: 
[O]ur society has long been organized in terms of the monogamous family 
structure, and this Court’s cases make clear that the interests arising from 
that structure enjoy procedural due process as well as equal protection im-
munity from governmental interference.  But it is something else to say that 
those interests are substantive constitutional rights.296 
	
 289 It does not matter if the citizens do or do not belong to a faith community.  On that point, I disagree 
with NeJaime and Siegel.  See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 119, at 2591 (arguing that groups and 
individuals who bring complicity-based conscience claims harm other citizens by enforcing tradi-
tional norms against individuals outside of their faith community who have different religious be-
liefs). 
 290 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. 
 291 Memorandum of William O. Douglas, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 10, 1971) (on 
file with Library of Congress, William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1553). 
 292 Memorandum from Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to the Conference on First 
Draft of Wisconsin v. Yoder (Apr. 7, 1972) (on file with Yale University Library, Potter Stewart Papers, 
Box 80). 
 293  Letter from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 10, 1972) (on file with Yale University Library, Potter Stewart Pa-
pers, Box 80) (copy on file with author).  
 294  Id.  
 295  Id.  
 296 Id.  
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The Chief Justice agreed to incorporate Potter Stewart’s two suggestions 
into a new draft that he circulated April 21st.  “As to ‘parental rights,’” he 
wrote to Stewart, “that can be converted into a looser observation as to the 
parental interest.”297  Stewart joined him, as did Brennan.  But on April 26th, 
Douglas circulated an unexpected dissenting opinion.298 
Douglas agreed “that the religious scruples of the Amish are opposed to 
the education of their children beyond the grade schools,” but he disagreed 
with the Court’s conclusion that the matter is “within the dispensation of 
parents alone.”299  “The difficulty with this approach,” according to Douglas, 
was that “parents are not seeking to vindicate their own free exercise claims, 
but those of their high-school age children.”300  The problem for him was 
that if the Court had for a long time shown “little regard for the views of the 
child,” in recent cases, it has declared that “the children themselves have [a] 
constitutionally protectible interest[ ] in their own right” and that they are 
“‘persons’ within the meaning of the Bill of Rights,” able to claims rights 
under the First or Fourteenth Amendments.301  Douglas referred to Barnette, 
where the Court had declared that the salute to the flag was in “interference 
with the child’s free exercise.”302  Douglas thought that in the present mat-
ter—his or her education and future—the child might have decided views.  
“He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an ocean geographer.  To 
do so he will have to break with the Amish tradition.”303  He should at least 
be heard.  Only one of the three children involved in the case had been heard 
as a witness in the trial—she had agreed to leave high school.  Because the 
two others had not spoken, Douglas dissented in their cases. 
One day later, on April 27th, Potter Stewart circulated a concurring opin-
ion, in which Brennan immediately joined.  The concurrence reminded the 
other Justices that Yoder concerned the criminal punishment of Amish parents 
who did not want their children to attend school in accordance with their 
religious beliefs.  It did not deal with “the right of children of Amish parents 
to attend public school . . . if they wish to do so,” the two Justices claimed.304  
“[ T ]here is no suggestion whatever in the record that the religious beliefs of 
	
 297 Letter from Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Potter Stewart, Associate Jus-
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(on file with Yale University Library, Potter Stewart Papers, Box 80) (copy on file with author). 
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 301 Id. at 1–2. 
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the children here concerned differ in any way from those of their parents,” 
Stewart added.305  To the contrary, the only student who testified answered 
that the reason she did not want to go to school was her religion.306 
On May 3rd, the Chief Justice added two pages to his latest draft.  In an 
explicit response to Douglas, he stated that the Court decision “in no degree 
depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child as contrasted 
with that of the parents.”307  The parents were subject to prosecution for fail-
ing to send their children to school.  It was their right of free exercise—not 
their children’s—that determined Wisconsin’s power to impose criminal 
penalties.308  Somewhat defensively, the Chief Justice added that:  
 Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible com-
peting interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state 
court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory 
that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high 
school despite their expressed desires to the contrary.309 
However, it was not over yet.  On May 11th, Justice White, joined by 
Stewart and Brennan, signed another concurring opinion finding that miss-
ing the ninth and tenth grades did not harm a person’s ability to resume a 
secular life if they later wished to do so.310 
Evidently, the heart of Douglas’s dissent, that parents’ choices could seri-
ously harm their mature children, was unsettling to his colleagues.  It pro-
voked a detailed response from the Chief Justice writing for the majority, as 
well as two concurring opinions emphasizing that the Court’s decision would 
not undermine the state’s interest in providing every child with a basic edu-
cation.  All Justices took seriously the issue of harm to third parties, i.e., the 
children.  In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger mentions that in the 
case, there was no “harm to the physical or mental health of the child.”311   
In his concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, Justice 
White went further, emphasizing that these exemptions, which would pro-
voke children’s early drop from high schools, would not harm their ability to 
make life choices, especially future professional ones.312 
	
 305  Id. at 1. 
 306 Id.  
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 311 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). 
 312 See id. at 240 (finding that the State has failed to demonstrate that Amish children who leave school 
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A majority of the Court—the dissent and the three concurring Justices—
were thus centrally concerned with the harm the decision should not do to 
the choices and interests of third parties (i.e., the children).313  In fact, when 
one reads all the opinions in Yoder in a row—the majority  and then, succes-
sively, the two concurring and the dissenting opinions, the feeling of discom-
fort is so obvious that we might ask if the Supreme Court’s decision would 
have been the same if the district court record had contained the testimony 
of a child who wished to remain in school.  There is good reason to have 
doubts.  One could even say that a careful reading of Yoder leads to an ac-
knowledgment that there is implicitly a conditionality to the exercise of the 
parents’ power to withdraw their children from school in the name of reli-
gious freedom: the mature children’s individual conscience, whatever this 
conscience is the product of—be it inner scruples or choice.314 
It is perhaps with this necessity in mind that John Rawls reacted to a 
situation in Yoder where “various religious sects oppose the culture of the 
modern world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted 
influences” by suggesting educating the children as to their constitutional 
rights.315  Rawls notes that: 
	
 313 The Justices’ concern was more about material harms (i.e., those with tangible, practical effects, 
such as access to goods and services) than with dignitary harms (i.e., social meaning, including 
stigma), which they could have been also concerned with.  See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 119, at 
2562 (describing litigants’ efforts to deny wedding services to same-sex couples, including the baking 
and selling of wedding cakes, citing religious beliefs). 
 314 Very few scholars raised the issue of children in their comments on Yoder, illustrating Marci Ham-
ilton’s study that the children are missing in law and religion scholarship.  See generally MARCI 
HAMILTON, The Missing Children in Law and Religion Scholarship, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: 
RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini 
& Michael Rosenfeld eds., 2017).  Leo Pfeffer raises the issue that the Court left unanswered a 
possible “conflict between the parents’ rights and the children’s religious freedom.”  LEO PFEFFER, 
GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURT AS REFEREE OF CHURCH-STATE 
CONFRONTATION 137 (1974).  The “rights of mature minors” was also an issue raised in Pfeffer’s 
brief to the Court, in the name of the Synagogue Council of America and its Constituents.   Brief 
for the Synagogue Council of America, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70-110), at 22.  Pfeffer mentions first, as most significant, the 
“high value which we have from our beginnings as a nation placed upon freedom of conscience.  
Recent decisions of this Court show that only the clearest proof of immediate threat to a compelling 
state interest will justify so serious an infringement upon that freedom.”  Id. at 4.  Then he notes 
that this case is not difficult because there is no division within the family either among the parents 
or between parents and children.  Id. at 22.  Basing his reasoning in the many domains in which a 
mature minor can make decisions on his or her own—for example, in joining the military or leaving 
school—Leo Pfeffer claims that the mature minor has a right to “participate in deciding the extent 
of his education, and that this right is within the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process 
Clause and the Ninth Amendment.”  Id. at 23; see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA 
GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 230–31 (2016) (de-
scribing Chief Justice Burger’s position that Yoder involved parents’ rights to determine their chil-
dren’s religious education, while the children are not parties to the litigation). 
 315  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 199 (1993). 
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The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster 
the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all 
of life.  But political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less.  It 
will ask that children’s education include such things as knowledge of their 
constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of 
conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all 
this to insure that their continued membership when they come of age is not 
based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for 
offenses that do not exist.316 
When passing RFRA, Congress reacted to Smith by explicitly referencing 
two and only two Supreme Court cases, Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
on which Hobby Lobby relies.  Sherbert v. Verner involved a Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist whose scruples of conscience could not permit working on the Sab-
bath.  They were individual scruples, which did not have any direct impact on 
other individuals.  This was not how Yoder was the most commonly inter-
preted, when the Court stated that parents could decide the educational fate 
of their adolescent children. 
However, as I have shown, in Yoder, the Douglas dissent is as important 
as the majority opinion for its impact on all of the other opinions in the case:  
freedom of religion cannot go against “individual conscience”—it must at 
least not harm it.  A majority of the Justices explicitly emphasized a “no 
harm” condition on the children of the Yoder parents. 
Whether conscience is a matter of choice or inner obligation, what is 
guaranteed in Sherbert and in Yoder is an individual freedom of conscience, 
which ought not to harm other individuals, including mature children able 
to express their own conscience.  It was with the invocation that no harm to 
other individuals resulted from the exercise of the freedom of conscience that 
Justice Kennedy could justify his decisive opinion in Hobby Lobby.  And it is 
on that ground—that the exemption does harm other individuals—that the 
challenge to Hobby Lobby is the most legitimate.317  However, in these cases of 
exemptions, when the Court decides to acknowledge conscience and to pro-
tect it, it creates an asymmetry in favor of the individual(s) protected that can 
be minimized or reduced, but not totally erased.  This preference should be 
minimized by the Court’s reception of the third parties’ testimonies that 
could help her decide on exemptions and assess harms. 
	
 316 Id.  
 317 For a critical approach of this point, see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 119, at 2532–33 (discussing 
the harm that accommodating religious-based conscience claims in Hobby Lobby may inflict on leg-
islative attempts to protect the rights of LGBT individuals). 
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CONCLUSION: COULD FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE BE A  
PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY OF U.S. CITIZENS? 
If individual freedom of conscience convincingly informs the entire fed-
eral judiciary’s jurisprudence regarding religion, why is this right not set and 
affirmed in the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution?  It is not a penum-
bra, as the penumbra is an emanation of rights expressed formally in the 
Constitution.318  Quite the opposite, in Stevens’s view, the rights proclaimed 
in the First Amendment emanate from freedom of conscience.  One could 
therefore associate this affirmation of freedom of conscience by Justice Ste-
vens and  by other prominent Justices  as what Philip Bobbitt calls an ethical 
interpretation of the Constitution.319  For Bobbitt, an ethical approach to the 
Constitution permits one to assert new personal rights beside the ones al-
ready in the text of the Constitution and to limit the means of the government 
on these newly recognized individual rights.320  But if freedom of conscience 
which arises, as a negative right, from the popular mobilization around Bar-
nette and against Smith, has justified the Court in limiting the means of gov-
ernment, it also developed, as a positive right, an obligation on the State to 
facilitate individuals’ freedom of conscience (e.g., by providing chaplains).321 
Why not therefore acknowledge the status of individual freedom of con-
science more explicitly in the jurisprudence, by making it a privilege and im-
munity of the citizen guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, one of the 
techniques Bobbitt suggests? 
In the battle that started with Gobitis and would eventually lead to Barnette, 
the Court debated the status of conscience or of conscientious scruples as 
absolute rights.  In Gobitis, Justices did not at first recognize conscience as an 
absolute right.  Justice Frankfurter stated, “the conscience of individuals col-
lides with the felt necessities of society.”322  “Even when it comes to these 
	
 318 See Benjamin M. Eidelson, A Penumbra Overlooked: The Free Exercise Clause and Lawrence v. Texas, 30 
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 203, 204 (2007) (“To be sure, the general debate over whether constitu-
tional rights must be spelled out explicitly in order to ‘count’ for the purposes of judicial review, or 
whether they may reasonably be inferred from the text’s capacious language, remains active.”). 
 319 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
 320 Id. at 176. 
 321 Some religion-clause scholars (e.g., John Witte and Steven D. Smith) have recently argued for a 
“jurisdictional” theory of conscience—i.e., that the state simply have no authority in questions of 
religion.  The idea of a positive right of conscience is, of course, different and contrary to a jurisdic-
tional theory.  See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 108 (2014) (“The religion clauses of the First Amendment came to be an anchor for hard 
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Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs the Family? Marriage as a New Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 4 
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dom to make judgments about sex, marriage, and family life based on their own religious beliefs.”). 
 322 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940). 
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ultimate civil liberties,” Frankfurter wrote to Justice Stone, “insofar as they 
are protected by the Constitution, we are not in the domain of absolutes.”323  
Stone, the lone dissenter in Gobitis, did not agree: in his dissent, he stated that 
although “the constitutional guaranties of personal liberty are not always ab-
solutes,” nevertheless “[t]he very essence of the liberty which they guaranty 
is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think 
and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness 
to his religion.”324  Two years later, however, in 1942, in the middle of the 
struggle that would lead to Barnette, a unanimous Supreme Court took a fur-
ther step, stating that there was an absolute individual personal right related 
to conscience and thought.  In the words of Justice Reed, writing for the 
majority in Jones v. City of Opelika:  
There are ethical principles of greater value to mankind than the guarantees 
of the Constitution, personal liberties which are beyond the power of gov-
ernment to impair.  These principles and liberties belong to the mental and 
spiritual realm, where the judgments and decrees of mundane courts are in-
effective to direct the course of man.  The rights of which our Constitution 
speaks have a more earthy quality.  They are not absolutes to be exercised 
independently of other cherished privileges, protected by the same organic 
instrument.”325   
And Chief Justice Stone—together with Justices Black and Douglas—joined 
Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion to affirm that freedom of thought was 
an “absolute” right.326 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, Senator Jacob M. 
Howard presented the clause as guaranteeing all the rights of the first eight 
amendments of the Bill of Rights.  This is not how the Court interpreted the 
clause in the Slaughter-House Cases; rather, it selected some absolute rights (i.e., 
rights which are not submitted to limitation through due process, such as 
property, liberty, or life).327  The Court distinguished the ones it defined as 
owing to the Constitution—namely, the rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth, 
	
 323 Letter of Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan Stone, Associate Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court 1–2 (May 27, 1940) (on file with Library of Congress, Harlan Stone 
Papers, Box 65). 
 324 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 602, 604 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 325 Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 593 (1942). 
 326 See id. at 618 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of 
religion all have a double aspect—freedom of thought and freedom of action.  Freedom to think is 
absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward work-
ings of the mind.”)  
327  Exactly two years after its Slaughter-House Cases decision, the Court, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 
162 (1875), confirmed its conception of privileges and immunities as absolute rights.  To Mrs. Vir-
ginia Minor, who claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment made her right to vote a privilege and 
immunity, the Court responded that Congress would not have included in the amendment the 
possibility of denying the right to vote to certain males “if suffrage was the absolute right of all 
citizens.”  88 U.S. 162, 175 (1875). 
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as rights to peaceably assem-
ble, petition for redress of grievances, and claim the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus—from other absolute rights which “owe their existence to the 
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”328  
Some of these rights are negative, but some are positive in the sense that they 
request some intervention of the state.  However narrowly defined, this min-
imalist conception turns out to be consequential.  Recently, Justice Stevens 
has used the approach of the Slaughter-House Cases’ majority opinion in deliv-
ering the Supreme Court’s opinion to reaffirm or to include in Saenz v. Roe329 
the absolute right of an American citizen to move and settle without condi-
tions in another state of residence within the U.S.  Within that perspective, 
would it not be possible for the Court to acknowledge the freedom of con-
science as an absolute right and privilege of the American citizen? 
As we have just seen, privileges and immunities do not need to be ex-
pressed in the wording of the Constitution to be recognized as such.  Isn’t the 
freedom of conscience a privilege and immunity as well?  Surging from an 
original repression in the final wording of the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution, freedom of conscience has come back in contemporary jurispru-
dence above explicitly enumerated constitutional rights as a kind of absolute 
right that trumps the formal expression of First Amendment liberties in the 
name of a higher liberty. 
Finding a space for this right in constitutional interpretation would in-
crease the Constitution’s ability to guarantee other rights, give a direction to 
the jurisprudence on religion, and emphasize its place in the meaning and 
purposes of the American Republic since its founding. 
 
	
 328 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873).  These include, for example, the rights to freely access the nation’s seaports 
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